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Chapter I
Faith and the Beatific Vision
In the opening sentence of his first formal treatise on faith, Scheeben
says:
First of all, with regard to faith, nothing more lofty or more
profound can be said about its nature than that it is a preliminary and an
anticipation of the visio beatifica. Precisely in this fact lies its
supernaturality, that by faith as by the vision we are raised to the
knowledge proper to God, that through His light we may know Him in His own
light, inaccessible to nature, — with this difference, that in faith our
elevation is imperfect, as in the vision it will be perfect(1).
It is undoubtedly significant of the youthful Scheeben’s mentality
that he should thus seize immediately upon what is “theologically the
chief truth”(2) about faith, and the point wherein is concentrated all its
mystery. It is moreover interesting to note that in the statement just given he
touches upon what we shall later see to be one of his leading ideas: “by
faith we are raised to the knowledge proper to God”. However, the
immediate point is that he regards the emphasis of this aspect of faith as
being demanded by traditional Catholic thought: only thus, he says, can we do
justice to the teaching of the Scriptures, the Fathers and the Church, all of
whom present faith as a new creation, a marvelous light, a gift
“toward whose acquisition nature can make not even the smallest
beginning.”(3) Furthermore, it is precisely to a neglect of this doctrine
that he attributes the deformations in the theology of faith current in his
time. In
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his earlier work he assigns as the reason for this neglect
“rationalistic views, and the lack of a sharp analysis of the notion
of faith”(4). Later in the Dogmatik, when reaffirming its cardinal
importance, he assigns another reason: loss of contact with the scholastic
tradition:
Much less was there in these systems(5) any mention, or indeed any
idea of the . . . inner relation of the theological faith to the beatific
vision, which is as decisive for the supernatural character of faith as it is
for the supernatural character of revelation . . . and which consequently was
selected by the older theologians, following especially St. Thomas, as the
starting point for the determination of the nature of faith(6).
It is then to the great thinkers of the past that Scheeben looks for his
inspiration. That he was wholly right in attributing a profound significance to
this particular doctrine in the teaching of St. Thomas, no one will deny. With
deliberate insistence St. Thomas posits as his very definition of faith:
“habitus mentis qua inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens
intellectum assentire non apparentibus”(7). Moreover in each of the three
places where the formula occurs he is engaged with the exegesis of the Pauline
definition of faith, and the phrase “qua inchoatur vita aeterna in
nobis” is intended as a transcription of St. Paul’s “substantia
rerum sperandarum”. Hence it is clear that for St. Thomas this notion was
at the very heart of the dogma of faith; upon it too he bases in greatest part
his philosophical development of the dogma, its theology, metaphysics,
psychology(8).
Naturally Scheeben’s appeal to St. Thomas invites to a comparison
of their respective theories, and to an
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estimate of the fidelity of
Scheeben’s thought to that of his avowed master (9). This comparison and
estimate we shall be in a position to make, at least in certain broad lines, at
the end of this and the ensuing section.
In the exposition of Scheeben’s thought we must begin by indicating
briefly how his doctrine on the relations between faith and the beatific vision
finds an organic place in his whole theory of “super-nature”(10). The
background of it is, in fact, his development of “the mystery of God in
the creature”, which, as he formulates it:
is a certain extension of the inner divine processions over the
creature, in that God prints upon it the image of His Son in the form of a
participation in His own nature, and thus in it regenerates His own Son; in
that moreover He breathes into the creature His own Spirit, and thus binds it
to Himself in the most intimate communion of life and love(11).
The doctrine of faith as the anticipation of the beatific vision finds
its natural insertion into these two fundamental mysteries of the supernatural
order, our adoption as the children of God in the image of His Son, our
participation in the divine nature, and the consequent communion in the divine
life with which we are thus “graced”. Even in his earliest work, the
Natur und Gnade, Scheeben’s thought has reached a quite
extraordinary detail and maturity. There, by a striking exploitation of the
data of Scripture, especially of St. John, and only to a lesser extent of St.
Paul, Scheeben establishes the continuity of faith and vision (expressed by the
word “inchoatio”) in terms of the divine sonship(12) that is ours by
grace: briefly, as
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children of God and sharers in His nature, it is our
fundamental privilege and power to know Him with a new knowledge, as Father,
perfectly in the vision, imperfectly in faith: Faith is essentially a
“participation in the divine knowledge”, and as such a prelude to the
vision. Secondly, he establishes the superior perfection of the vision in terms
of the two stages distinguished by Scripture in the possession of our sonship
and of its corresponding heritage. So much for a bald, and inadequate
statement.
The illuminative principle guiding Scheeben’s exposition in its
details is the notion of the eternal generation of the Son of God as the
prototype of our own regeneration by grace. On this principle he insists often:
The life to which we have been born is not any sort of a life; it is
the divine life which God Himself possesses and which He communicates in its
fullness to His only-begotten Son(13).
Herewith is furnished us the key to an understanding of our own lofty
dignity:
The relations which we as children have to God are to be measured by
the standard of those which the only-begotten natural Son of God has to his
Father(14).
And particularly to be considered, as leading to the point to be made in
the present discussion, is our relation to the Father as His heirs. In this
connection Scheeben invokes the doctrine of St. John on the Divine Word:
In the Holy Scriptures St. John is accustomed to give as the special
prerogative of the Son of God, which he enjoys above all created nature, this
one that as He is the Word of the Father, proceeding
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from His knowledge and His
mouth, and precisely for this reason is His Son, His exact image and in
all things His equal, so also and as such He possesses in the vision of the
Father His essential life and His heritage(15).
The text is of course John 1, 18:
Here the relation of the Son to the Father seems to be characterized,
and hence also our own relation seems to be exactly designated. The grace of
the sonship and the life of children of God consists precisely in this, that
they receive the truth and the light by which the Word of God is His
natural Son. For this truth and this light, contained in the vision of God, are
the proper privilege of the Son who is in bosom of the Father, while the
servant stands without, and cannot enjoy the sweet vision of the Father’s
face(16).
The reality of our sonship brings with it, as a heritage, a new
knowledge of God that would otherwise be denied us; it admits us to the
possession of that truth and light in which consist the riches of the Father,
and which constitute His legacy to His Son, and to us in His Son.
Thus far the parallelism between ourselves and God’s only Son holds
good. But then a great difference enters. For Him the possession of His sonship
is identically and fully the possession of His heritage(17); by His eternal
generation He receives the nature of the Father in all its plenitude, and with
that nature He receives the Father’s eternal life in all its infinite
actuality. Not so with us. We are indeed the children of God and His heirs, but
we have not yet entered upon our full heritage, our full divine life:
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with us the obtaining of our sonship is separated from the
obtaining of our heritage, but for this reason only, that with us the
generation and the birth is two-fold. We are already gene-rated, born of God in
the Holy Ghost through the bath of regeneration, but nevertheless we are still
waiting for our better regeneration, of which the first is but the pledge and
the preliminary(18).
Only through this second generation, which is at once the obtaining of
our heritage, shall we become children of God in the most perfect sense, for
then the divine life already communicated to us will reach its full
development:
For this reason the Scriptures say at times that we are, and at other
times that we shall be the children of God, and that we ‘still await the
adoption of the children of God'. St. John unites both ideas: “We are now
the children of God, but it hath not yet appeared what we shall be” (I
John 3, 2). We bear in us the seed which later shall unfold its full blossom.
We are now but small children, as it were, in the bosom of the love of God, who
cling to Him in childlike love, but then we shall be full-grown sons and men,
who manifest in themselves the full splendor of their Father(19).
In developing this idea Scheeben follows St. John a step farther,
invoking the principle already mentioned, namely that our adoption as children
is in a certain sense an “extension” of the procession of the Eternal
Son from the Father, by whom He was sent into the world that He might give to
all who should believe in Him the power to become the children of God,
receiving into themselves the image of their Heavenly Father:
As a matter of fact, our glory likewise(20)
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consists precisely in
this, that we receive the image of God in us and become like to Him. But we
receive His image in us, to speak first of the perfect generation, because as
St. John says we see Him as He is (I John 3, 2); because namely He fills us
with His divine light (the lumen gloriae), whereby we become capable of
reflecting in ourselves the essence of God in its proper beauty and splendor,
thus to be transformed into His image . . . . Hence by His new generation God
communicates to us also the heritage of His Son, which He (the Son) receives by
His generation; by it He bestows upon us His light, to transfigure us into His
image, and He grants us His knowledge and love that we as children in His bosom
may have in the vision of Him our eternal and blessed life(21).
The notion that Scheeben here seizes in the text of St. John is the
profoundly mysterious one of the lumen gloriae as the instrument, so to
speak, of our second generation: the knowledge of God is a transforming power
whereby we are made over into His image; we become like to Him because
we see Him as He is(22).
And this same notion serves him in his development of the imperfect
stage of our sonship. Here for the light of faith is claimed a function
parallel to that of the light of glory, this time however in dependence rather
on St. Paul:
Before however it is revealed what we shall be, before the image of
our Heavenly Father is engendered in us in its full and complete splendor, and
Christ our Life appears, our life is hidden with Christ in God. But
nevertheless we do live, and we do bear His image in us; and we are
consequently born of God. For the Savior says that He has
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already revealed to
us in a way the name of the Father; by faith, says the Apostle, Christ already
dwells in our hearts. Faith itself is indeed a light, sunk by the Father of
Light in our souls, a dark and hidden light to be sure, but a light that in
truth streams just as directly from the source of Eternal Light as the clear
beatific vision of God in His Word; faith also is a participation in the
knowledge of the Eternal Word. By faith also we already know God as our
Father, and we are for this very reason already born of Him by faith, as
children in His image. For dark though it be, still the knowledge of faith
fills our souls with such a light and splendor that even now we are transformed
by it into the image of the Lord, since by faith we are already ‘light in
the Lord’ (Eph. 5, 8), Who has called us out of darkness into His
marvelous light. Of faith too is to be understood the word of the Apostle:
‘But we all with faces unveiled (that is, not covered with a veil, as if we knew God only through creatures, as a poor mirror) beholding the glory
of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the
Spirit of the Lord’(23). {Italics mine}
And the conclusion is:
Thus we have by the light of faith an anticipation of the glory and
the life which we as co-heirs of the Son are to receive as our heritage in the
vision of our Father. And as it is by this heritage that we become in fullest
measure children of God, so also our first generation communicates to us with
the life of the children of God likewise a pledge of our inheritance(24).
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The line of thought hitherto followed may be briefly stated thus: by the
grace of our adoption we are destined and admitted to a share in the life of
the Father that is by nature accorded only to the Son: this share in the life
of the Father consists above all in a share in His own knowledge of Himself, or
rather, a share in His Son’s knowledge of Him; to know the Father as He is
in Himself (i.e. as Father) is the proper life of the Son, Who is His image; we
therefore, born of the Father in the image of His Son, are gifted too with His
heritage, the knowledge of the Father. However in the achievement of our
supernatural destiny, in our transformation into the image of the Father, two
stages are divinely appointed: the perfect stage of vision and the imperfect
stage of faith. Nevertheless, for all their differences, both faith and vision
are genuine participations in that knowledge of God which is the natural
privilege of His Divine Son; both faith and vision are a share in the divine
light, which illumines the God-head as such. Since they are such, their effect
is to transform us into the image of the Father of Light. It is this last point
which is capital. Scheeben puts it definitely, though in his favorite
metaphorical terms, when he says:
By faith, as the divine light is us, begins our kinship with the
Father of Light. For since the divine nature is the purest light, we achieve
kin-ship with it in that we ourselves become light. And so faith, even without
love, is still the beginning of our divine filiation, since by it we bear in
ourselves the image of the Lord (25).
And elsewhere:
We become like to God, the Father of Light, in that he kindles in us a
light like unto His own.
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our likeness to the Father consists precisely in
this, that He communicates to us a divine power of knowing; by it we know the
divine essence, we reflect and imprint it upon ourselves truly after the
fashion of His only-begotten Son Who proceeds from Him as His Word and His
reflection; and thus we receive the divine image into ourselves, and so become
conformed to the image of His Son (Rom. 8, 29)(26).
Sufficient has been said to show the general lines of Scheeben’s
development of the relations between faith and the beatific vision, as
contained in the Natur und Gnade. It is not necessary to comment on his
rhetoric, much of it rather good. More important is the revelation of a number
of viewpoints, ideas and methods that were fundamental in his thought right
from the earliest years of his literary activity.
I might note first of all the constant recurrence in the passages quoted
of St. James’ characterization of God as “the Father of
Light”(27); for Scheeben, this was the epithet that most exactly designed
by analogy the nature of God. Corresponding to it is the oft-repeated
description of “supernature” in terms of light, in obvious and
acknowledged dependence on the text of St. Paul, Ephesians 5,8(28). A third
correspondence is the traditional notion of faith as a light, “sunk by the
Father of Light into our souls”, which have themselves become light, and
thus like to Him; this notion streams all through Scheeben’s thought on
faith(29).
A second and correlative idea, to which attention has already been
called, is that of faith as “a participation in the knowledge of
God”, or elsewhere, “in the knowledge of the Divine Word”. It is
important to
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observe that this notion, which, as we shall see, comes into even
greater prominence in the Dogmatik, is already strongly underlined in
the Natur und Gnade. One must definitely see in it the master-idea that
captivated Scheeben’s imagination, and dominated and directs to a
preponderating extent his theology of faith. Whether the emphasis he places on
it resulted ultimately in an undue submergence of some of the other elements of
his thought, will have later to be determined. No other theologian has so
capitalized the idea, and at all events, it would be interesting to know just
what led him to this emphasis. Of course the idea in itself, with its mystical
overtones, would be such as to appeal to his particular quality of mind. And
finding it in tradition(30), he would naturally seize upon it; one is inclined
to think that it corresponded to what may be regarded as one of his fundamental
“experiences” of faith, the more so in that Scheeben was more
conscious of the plenitude of the possession of God to be had by faith than he
was of that mysterious “absence” of its object which was an
affliction to the far more exigent spirit of St. Thomas(31). Nevertheless, the
idea itself is definitely marked in St. Thomas(32), and one must see, I think,
Thomistic inspiration in Scheeben’s use of it(33).
At the same time, in addition to the fact that he saw in this formula
the aptest and most forceful expression of the supernaturality of faith and of
its basically mystical nature(34), other considerations of a more systematic
character doubtless contributed to its emphasis in his system. His thought was
of course always of an essentially synthetic character(35); and in building up
the other master-idea of his theology, namely that of “supernature”
as the “image of the
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supreme spiritual and intellectual nature of
God”(36) in which we participate by grace, the notion of
supernature’s “fundamental activity”(37) as a participation in
the knowledge of God comes readily to hand; the two formulas complement one
another. This is particularly true when one considers on the one hand his
insistence on the necessity of studying the new nature and its powers in their
stage of highest developments, namely in the vision(38), and on the other hand
the parallelism, already noted, that he is fond of instituting between the
light of faith and the light of glory(39).
It is this last point which aids us in grasping the import Scheeben
attaches to the formula: faith is an anticipation of the beatific vision. In
his own way, he grasped the absolute centrality of the vision and man’s
destiny to it, that is characteristic of Thomistic theology(40). For him the
vision was essentially a participation of God’s knowledge of Himself,
operated by “God’s light”(41). To say then that faith is an
anticipation of the vision is to assert that it too is a participation in
God’s knowledge of Himself(42). The two formulas are synonymous.
The actual similarities which Scheeben sees between faith and the
vision, i.e. the aspects under which faith is a participation in the divine
knowledge and hence an anticipation of the vision, may be classed under two
heads.
The first has already been indicated in the formula: faith is a share in
the knowledge of the Eternal Word. Its characteristic then is to know the
Father as Father, to know God “as He is in Himself”, since this is
the privilege of the Son:
faith coincides with the vision in regard to the chief object
which it knows. This is true not
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merely insofar as the two in some way or other
know the same object (as objectum materiale commune), but also insofar as the
aspect under which it is known is the same in both cases (ratio formalis sub
qua cognoscitur). The fact is that faith is an anticipation of the vision of
God. Consequently faith, like the vision, knows God not merely insofar as He is
reflected in created nature and is thus knowable by ascension from it: it knows
God as He is in Himself, independent of all connection with created nature as
such. Hence that which faith knows in God is something supernatural, not for
God Himself, but in reference to the manifestation of God in created nature. We
shall see later in detail that this consists chiefly in the inner revelation
and unfolding of the Godhead in the Trinitarian processions(43).
In this sense then faith is a participation in the knowledge of God: it
is an introductory glimpse into the inner life of God, whose substantial
expression in the Word and the Spirit we are later blissfully to contemplate.
Here is a field of knowledge proper only to the divine mind; hence to share it
is to share God’s knowledge of Himself.
There is a further meaning to the notion of faith as a participation in
the knowledge of God and an anticipation of the vision, that comes to
expression when Scheeben is actually constructing his argument for the
supernaturality of faith from its relation to the vision:
In faith we learn by anticipation that knowledge (Wissenschaft) of His
that we are to obtain possession of in the visio beatifica. As this (the
vision) cannot be effected by our light, but only
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by God’s
light, so also that learning, insofar as it is directed to that
knowledge by way of an introduction and preparation, cannot be achieved by our
light, but only by the divine light. The learning itself elevates us above
nature, in that our Teacher does not in some way or other communicate to us
something that He knows, but wills to lift us right up to the plane of His
knowing. Hence His knowledge must come into immediate contact with us (muss
uns unmittelbar nahe treten) in all its sublimity, and we must lift ourselves,
or rather be lifted up to it(44) {Italics in text}.
In this passage there is question not of the objective but of the
subjective side of faith. Faith not only shares in God’s knowledge by
sharing its object, it is itself a definitely Godlike type of knowing, operated
in us by “God’s light”; in faith we are lifted up to the plane
of God’s knowing; by faith we are somehow brought into an immediate
contact with God(45).
The argument is sufficiently obscure, especially in its deduction of
these properties of faith from the fact that it is an anticipation of the
vision. However since the way to its clarification lies through a discussion of
Scheeben’s theory of supernatural acts, and in particular of his theory as
to the workings of the light of faith, we must be content for the present with
having indicated the chief point: it is definitely in the subjective aspect of
faith, i.e. faith as a cognition, that we must seek to complete the meaning of
Scheeben’s favorite formula: faith, as an anticipation of the vision, is a
participation in the knowledge of God. This point immediately suggests another,
also to be established later, namely that for Scheeben the subjective quality
of faith as a cognition plays a decisive role in the determination of its
supernaturality.
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One addition is here to be made. Since so far we have been examining
only the doctrine of the Natur und Gnade, it may be well
to introduce a pertinent quotation from the Dogmatik, with the purpose
of showing that the broad lines of Scheeben’s early thought endure in his
later work:
More in particular, the supernaturality of the intellectual assent
becomes clear from the fact that according to the Apostle faith is the
substantia rerum sperandarum, hence an anticipation of the future possession of
the res sperandae or of the knowledge to be had in the lumen gloriae, hence not
merely preparatio but inchoatio vitae aeternae. Accordingly as the assent of
faith belongs to the same order of cognition as the visio beatifica, so also
the grace of faith after the analogy of the lumen gloriae is called lumen
fidei, and its communication is called illumination. Now, since the visio
beatifica is a participation in God’s own life, —for which reason its
light must be an emanation of the Godhead’s own light, —so must faith be
a participation in God’s own knowledge. Consequently faith must contain
such a union and assimilation to the divine knowledge as only God Himself can
infuse into us(46).
The points of similarity with what we have already seen are too clear to
need comment, while the same essential obscurity remains: what is the
subjective nature of the assent of faith, as operated by God’s own light?
This must be regarded as one of the cardinal questions to claim our attention.
The present section may be concluded with a few remarks on the subject
of Scheeben’s “Thomism”, as it stands so far revealed. It would
of course not be
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difficult to show his fidelity, if not to the architectonic
lines, certainly to the fundamental positions of St. Thomas with regard to the
supernatural order and the nature of grace(47); however it is rather to the
question of faith that we must confine ourselves.
We have already seen that Scheeben’s basic conception of faith as a
participation in the knowledge of God can claim for itself a Thomistic
inspiration. Yet there can be no doubt that in pursuing and emphasizing this
Thomistic idea Scheeben goes far beyond St. Thomas himself, and thereby imparts
to his theory on relations between faith and the vision an accent that is
definitely not Thomistic. This difference of accent is already indicated in the
difference of their respective formulas. St. Thomas’ specific is:
“fides est habitus mentis qua inchoatur vita aeterna in
nobis”; Scheeben however definitely prefers the phrase: “anticipatio
visionis beatificae”, a phrase which is not found in St. Thomas(48). If
this be a question of nuance, at least the nuance is important. And one might
give it expression by saying that in Scheeben’s formula the relations
between faith and the vision are conceived in more intellectual and static
terms, whereas St. Thomas’ formula imparts to them a meaning distinctly
more dynamic and affective.
The sense of this antithesis comes clear from a consideration of the
divergent backgrounds of their respective theories. St. Thomas, notably in the
profoundly suggestive second article of De Veritate, q. xiv, projects
his definition of faith against the background of a metaphysics of final
causality, as applied to the problem of human beatitude(49). His ground
principle is:
Nihil autem potest ordinari in aliquem finem nisi
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praeexistat in ipso
quaedam proportio ad finem, ex qua proveniat in ipso desiderium finis: et hoc
est secundum quod aliqua inchoatio finis fit in ipso; quia nihil appetit nisi
in quantum appetit aliquam illius similitudinem(50).
The principle, — which postulates a real pre-continence and
pre-figuration of a being’s final perfection in the as yet imperfect
being, as the source of its tendency to that perfection(51), — is then
applied to the question of human beatitude, both “natural” and
“supernatural”. And therefrom results St. Thomas’ favorite
parallelism between divine faith and the “first principles” of
reason, which constitute the “inchoatio beatitudinis naturalis”(52).
The whole passage gives the notion of faith as an active principle, informing
and elevating nature, and imparting to it the power effectively to direct
itself to its supernatural destiny, the life eternal that consists in the
immediate vision of God. An essential point is that the vision is conceived in
its teleological relation to man, i.e. as his divinely appointed last end, in
which he is to find that perfect realization of himself in which must consist
his beatitude. Correlatively, faith is conceived essentially as the fundamental
principle of purposeful striving toward that final self-perfection; this it is,
not only in that it reveals to man a supernatural beatitude as really
obtainable, by revealing it to be God’s will for him, but also in that it
equips him with a power proportioned to its achievement. In this sense, as an
application of the universal metaphysical principle, faith is an inchoatio
vitae aeternae, an imperfecte habere finem.
Hence the term “dynamic”, used to characterize St.
Thomas’ concept of faith. For him faith was a new
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orientation of human
life toward a new end beyond the reach of nature, at least of its effective
strivings; it was the impression by God of a new dynamism upon human thought,
desire and action. And since this new dynamism is impressed, not directly and
primarily upon the intellect, but upon the will(53), which “the Holy
Spirit . . . corrects from infidelity to faith”(54), and is communicated by
the will to the intellect in the form of an assent by which the intellect
“obeys the will which is adhering to God”(55), hence it is that this
dynamism must be conceived and qualified as “affective”(56). Thus
conceived, faith becomes, in virtue of the Thomistic doctrine on final
causality, a real though only inchoative possession of that full
self-perfection, that full divine life which is one day to fulfill its
finality, in the clear, transforming vision of God. And this is the fundamental
Thomistic conception of faith, the sum of its intellectual and affective
content: it is the “primum principium motus in Deum”(57), and as such
it is necessarily a real possession, in potency and exigence, of the term of
that motion: “finis fidei . . .. salus animarum” (1. Peter 1-19).
Linked with this aspect of faith is another, prominent in the thought of
St. Thomas, namely that of faith giving birth not to the joy of the possession
of God, but primarily to the desire of possessing Him: “ex quo provenit in
ipso desiderium finis”. Faith, as already noted, meant for St. Thomas
essentially a “quest” of the “Deus absens”, Who is
“finis omnium desideriorum”(58). And this profound religious
intuition, so intimately Augustinian, is justified in St. Thomas by his strict
Aristotelian theory of cognition, which forbade making the regime of faith
anything but a provisory and
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transient, restless and unsatisfactory stage in
the working out of human destiny(59). Here is the third structural rib in St.
Thomas’s theory. Faith, as an assent to mystery on pure authority, an
intellectual acceptance of that which is unintelligible, an apprehension of
that which is absent from the mind, cannot bring rest to the human spirit:
“in cognitione fidei invenitur operatio imperfectissima quantum ad id quod
est ex parte intellectus, quamquam maxima perfectio invenitur ex parte
objecti”(60). And this imperfection of faith is a correlative of its
nature as a beginning, a preparation; we are as little schoolchildren in whose
minds has been “planted”(61) the knowledge of those things
“whereby we are to be led to life eternal”(62). Only hope and
love can render this state of violence supportable, as only hope and love can
plunge us into it; and so in the darkness we trustingly “cling to
the truth which consists in the divine knowledge”(63). The Master,
“perfectus sui cognitor”, puts us in possession of His own knowledge,
thus to draw us to the possession of Himself. Thus only at last does the notion
of faith as a share in the knowledge of God enter into the thought of St.
Thomas, —an essential notion, certainly, but one wholly subordinate to the
dynamic concept of faith as the “primus motus mentis in Deum” - beatificantem.
My purpose in sketching, inadequately of course, certain of the guiding
lines of St. Thomas’ analysis of faith is merely to show how far from them
Scheeben’s own thought moves. It is quite obvious that his formula, faith
is an anticipation of the beatific vision, fails completely to suggest, either
in itself or in its developments, the theological, metaphysical, and religious
riches wherewith St. Thomas’ formula is
[p. 84]
pregnant. With its exclusively
intellectual connotations, it leaves quite untouched the only starting point
from which one may hope to develop adequately the nature of faith as revealed
to us in the Pauline description, rephrased by Trent: fides est substantia
rerum sperandarum, initium salutis. The point in question is, in M.
Chenu’s phrase, “(le) dynamisme affectif de la foi en quête du
Dieu béatifiant”(64). Hence with regard to the relations between
faith and the beatific vision we must judge Scheeben to have fallen
considerably short, not only in his earlier but in his later work, of the
doctrine of his supposed master, St. Thomas. This can be said without any
prejudice to the genius of the disciple, —that genius was sufficiently great
to allow us to take cognizance of its limitations. Certainly no one will deny
the striking nature of his speculative gifts in the strictly theological order,
and one must admit that his philosophy had all the soundness of Rome. But it is
another question whether to him were vouchsafed the specific gifts of a
metaphysician, epistemologist, critical philosopher. At least in his handling
of the subject of faith they are not conspicuous.
I have then indicated the most profound difference that separates
Scheeben’s thought from that of St. Thomas with regard to faith and the
vision. The difference is interesting in a triple respect. First of all,
considering the times in which Scheeben lived, it is interesting to see his
devotion to St. Thomas, and the sure intelligence with which he seized St.
Thomas’ fundamental position in the question of faith. Scheeben had indeed
an unerring instinct in appreciating fundamental positions. Secondly, it is
interesting to see how he characteristically did not penetrate nor
[p. 85]
develop
along its own lines the thought upon which he evidently wished to draw. Just as
he refused to commit himself wholly to one master, though that master be the
Angelic Doctor, so also he refused to follow any master’s inner ways of
thought. St. Thomas builds his theory of faith upon the basis of a theory of
natural intelligence, its finality and its significance for the problem of
human destiny. Scheeben never - either in his earlier or in his later works -
reaches out for anything philosophically so ultimate. Apart even from the fact
that such theorizing was foreign to his mentality, his actual preoccupations
forbade it. His thinking, as we shall see more fully later, was historically
conditioned, —he lived very much in the nineteenth century. And in his Natur und Gnade he threw himself into the task of restoring to his age
the concept that it had lost, the concept of what he calls “Christian
ontology”(65). This aim had its consequences upon his doctrine on faith.
He evolves it exclusively in terms of the fundamental reality of the
specifically supernatural order, namely the new nature which is ours by grace,
whose basic activity is the knowledge of God had in faith. Into this scheme of
course the beatific vision, which is the fulfillment of faith, and whose light
is imperfectly shared in faith, is introduced for its supreme illustrative
value. But the third element of the Thomistic trio, the third “light”
which was so important for St. Thomas, has no structural place in
Scheeben’s theory. Whether one considers the defect so serious as to
render all his speculations ultimately inadequate, will depend of course to a
decisive extent on one’s own theories. At all events, the point I wish to
make - the last - is this, that Scheeben’s only partial grasp of St.
Thomas’
[p. 86]
thought, and his preoccupations with his own aims, were destined
to have considerable effect upon his theology of faith. First of all, it
imparted to his early thought a predominantly intellectual character. Then
later when he did actually develop up the affective aspect of faith into its
requisite prominence (under the pressure of still more definitely apologetic
preoccupations, as we shall see), it was only to establish between it and the
intellectual aspect an antithesis which he had no means of reducing. He had
missed the key to the problem, which St. Thomas might have given him, and the
key which he fashioned for himself would not work. That also we shall see.
NOTES
Chapter I
- Natur und Gnade (ed. Grabmann) p.
237.
- M.D. Chenu: La psychologie de la foi dans
la Théologie due XIIe siècle: Etude d’histoire
littéraire et doctrinale du XIIIe siècle: Ilème ser; pg.
172.
- Natur und Gnade p. 237.
- Ibid. p. 237.
- He refers to those of Hermes and
Günther, and apparently also, though less directly to Kuhn’s.
- Dogmatik II, 1, n. 658.
- II q.4, a. 1 c; also De Ver. q. 14, a. 2 c;
in Ep. ad Hebr. c. xi, 1.1.; cf. in Eph. c. iii, 1. 5: Jam in nobis res
sperandas per modum cujusdam inchoationis (fides) facit subsistere.
- Cf. Schumpp: Der Glaubensbegrif,f des
Hebräerbriefes and seine Deutung durch den hl. Thomas von. Aquin.
Divus Thomas (Fribourg) XI (1933) pp. 397-410. Cf. especially p. 405, on St.
Thomas’ fidelity to Greek Patristic exegesis. Cf. also M. Mathis: The
Pauline pistis-upostasis according to Hebrews 11, 1. Washington (Catholic
University) 1920.
- It is from St. Thomas that Scheeben took
“the plan and principles” of the Natur und Gnade (ibid. p.
31). Obviously it is no good discus-sing the question whether or not Scheeben
was a “Thomist”; thus put, the question has no meaning. It has been
often enough pointed out that he consistently refused loyalty to any
“school” (cf. I. Jeiler: Lit. Handw. 1877, col. 86; Grabmann:
Scheebens Auffassunq vom Wesen ued Wert der theologischen Wissenschaft,
in: Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Der Erneuerer katholischen
Glaubenswissenschaft; p. 105: Es wird meines Erachtens sehr schwer sein,
Scheeben aus einer Schule zu erklären oder in eine Schule
einzureihen”. Et sqq.) Scheeben himself more than once energetically
repels the suggestion that he was interested in “eine jedem Fortschritte
entsagende Repristination der alten Scholastik” (Vorwort to
Mysterien. p. xi), about which there was at the time such a hue and cry.
Significant also is his criticism of the “Thomism” of C. von
Schäzler as “somewhat crude” (cf. Katholik 1868 I, p. 699 ff.);
it was his only objection to a theologian whom he otherwise valued highly.
Hence it can here be a question merely of signalizing certain Thomistic ideas
that Scheeben utilized for his own purposes, and more particularly, of adopting
the principles of St. Thomas as a standard and measure of criticism.
- Though the word is not established in
English, it does conveniently for a translation of Scheeben’s central
concept of Uebernatur. for his defence of the term (not his own coinage)
cf. Natur und Gnade p. 33; for the development of its meaning ibid. pp.
58-60.
- Mysterien, p. 187.
- Scheeben would object to the term
“sonship” (Sohnschaft). It is however the consecrated term in
English; we cannot say “childship”, though it would turn the German
“Kindschaft” better.
- Natur und Gnade _ p. 141. Cp.
Casini-Scheeben: p. 275. 330 etc.
- Ibid. p. 144; cf. pp. 126-128, 131 ff, 146
ff, etc. The substance of Scheeben’s development of this idea he derives
from St. Thomas, III, q. 23, a. 3; cf. Natur und Gnade p. 131 note. It may be
remarked that the notion is classic with the Greek Fathers; cf. Hugo Rahner:
Die Gottesqeburt. Zeitschr. f. kath. Theologie LIX (1935) p. 351-365.
- Natur und Gnade, p. 157.
- Ibid. p. 156.
- Ibid. p. 152-3.
- Ibid. p. 154.
- Ibid p. 154. It is interesting to note that
the metaphor in the last sentence is found in Maximus Confessor (Liber
Ambiguorum PG 91. 1068 B; cf. Rahner 1. cit. pp. 376-383, especially p. 380, on
Maximus, to whom Scheeben was particularly attracted; cf. Natur und Gnade
p. 243 note - where he is called Maximus Martyr — and p. 282).
Scheeben’s patristic erudition, even at the time of writing the Natur
und Gnade, was truly remarkable.
- I.e. like the glory of the Son, of which he
has just been speaking.
- Natur und Gnade 156-7.
- Cf. Casini-Scheeben p. 337, where he quotes
I John 3, 2 and 2 Cor 3, 18, two of his favorite texts quoted also in
Mysterien p. 619. Cf. also Dogmatik II, 3. n. 704, where he
quotes St. Thomas, I, q. 12, a. 5. The notion is of course genuinely Thomistic;
cf. ibid. ad 3m; a. 6c; C. G. II, c. 53; De Ver. q. 10, a. 7 c.; Sum. Th. I, q.
27, a. 1 ad 2m.
- Natur und Gnade pp. 159-160.
- Ibid. p. 160. For the same cycle of ideas
cf. Mysterien p. 623-630, esp. 627.
- Natur und Gnade p. 178.
- Ibid. pp. 146-7.
- The text is James 1, 17. Literally the
phrase: apo tou patros ton photon means “from the creator of the
stars”, —this from its Old Testament background. However the allegorical
sense, in which Scheeben constantly uses the text, is quite legitimate, and
even indicated by the context. Cf. J. Chaine, L’Epitre de S.
Jacques (Paris, 1927) p. 24.
- Natur und Gnade p. 180.,215 etc.
Cp. Mysterien p. 619: grace operates an “Umgestaltung in das
Lichtbild der Gottheit”. Correlative is his constant use of
“Verklärung” as the term best suited to indicate the effects of
grace and of glory: ibid. p. 618.
- Cf. Hugo Lang: Die Lehre des hl. Thomas
von Aquin von der Gewissheit des übernattürlichen Glaubens, pp.
77 sq., on St. Thomas’ use of the same meta-phor: “Von alien
tiberlieferten Analogien zieht Thomas nur eine einzige zur durchftihrenden
Systematisierung seiner Ansichten vom Grunde der Glaubensgewissheit heran. Am
häufigsten and bezeich-nendsten wird bei ihm der Glaubenshabitus mit dem
Licht verglichen”, p. 77. The metaphor is of course Aristotelian, but also
traditional in theology: “Im Uebrigen war die Vergleichung des
Glaubenshabitus mit dem Licht and seine letzte Herleitung aus dem Lichte Gottes
in Schrift, Väterlehre and Schulüberlieferung festverwurzelt”,
p. 78.
- Cf. the interesting quotation from
Pseudo-Dionysius, Natur und Gnade . p. 243 note.
- Cf. S. Th. II-II q. 5, a. 1 ad 1m on the
diffe-rence between Adam’s faith and ours:“non erat in eis
fides qua ita quaereretur Deus absens, sicut et nos”. M. de
la Taille calls attention (Rech. Sc. Pel. 18 (1928) p. 317) to the two types of
mystics: “selon les divers temperaments et les circonstances
diverses, l’un est plus sensible à l’aspect du vide, et
l`autre à la plénitude”. He is speaking of course of
genuine mystical experience, which however is essentially of the same order as
faith, in his opinion. It may be noted that Scheeben was fully, conscious of
the obscurity of faith too: Mysterien 614; 741. On the double
“experience” of faith, cf. also R. Guardini, Vom Leben des
Glaubens, pp. 119-120.
- In Lib. Boeth. de Trin. q. 2 a. 2 c:
“Et sic de divinis duplex
habetur scientia: una quidem secundum modum nostrum . . . . Alia secundum modum
ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum seipsa capiantur: quae quidem
perfecte nobis in statu viae est impossibilis, sed fit in nobis quaedam illius
cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad divinam cognitionem, in
quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi veritati primae propter
seipsam. I-II q. 110, a. 4 c: “per potentiam intellectivamhomo
participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei.”
De Ver. q. 14, a~ 8 6: “fides . . . facit intellectum hominis adhaerere veritati quae in divina cognitione
consistit, transcendendo proprii intellectus veritatem . . . .fides . . . .hominem
divinae coqnitioni conjungit per assensum.”
- Cf. Dogmatik I, p. 291 note, where
he quotes De Ver. q. 14, a. 8. I do not find him anywhere using the texts from
the In Boeth. de Trin. or the Prima Secundae, both of which approach more
closely to his own formula: Teilnahme an der g8ttlichen Erkenntnis. It remains
always some-what doubtful whether he actually derived the idea from St. Thomas,
or merely sought in St. Thomas confirmation of it.
- On the mystical nature of faith he insists:
e.g. Natur und Gnade p. 120; cp. p. 162.
- Cf. the statement of his method of
procedure in Natur und Gnade p.120; cp. p. 162.
- Natur und Gnade p. 233; cp. p. 127.
It should be remarked that one of Scheeben’s greatest services to theology
was precisely his emphasis upon this basic Thomistic doctrine, that by grace “habet anima quoddam spirituale esse” (De Virt.·in
Com. a. 1 c). The theology of the “Aufklarung”, had lost it
completely, and it was not a little threatened by the moralism of Tubingen: cf.
Natur und Gnade p. 148, where Staudenmaier is named. Scheeben’s
position is well put by Schmaus:
“Das Wesen des Christentums
ist nicht zunächst ein Tun, sondern ein Sein. Christsein heisst nicht
zunächst seine Gesinnung nach der Gesinnung Gottes ausrichten. . . .
Christentum ist nicht in erster Linie eine Gesinnungsgemeinschaft mit Gott. Es
ist vielmehr in erster Linie eine Seinsgemeinschaft mit Gott. In treuer
Bundesgenossenschaft mit Konstantin von Schäzler hielf Scheeben these
Lehre gegen Kuhn aufrecht”.
(Die Stellunq Scheeben’s in der
Theoloqie des 19 Jahrhunderts; Scheeben, der Erneuerer etc. p. 41).
However Scheeben’s attitude to Kuhn was quite different from v.
Schäzler’s cf. Katholik 1868 1 484-502; II 689-730; review; cf. v.
Schäzler’s Neue Untersuchungen.
- Natur und Gnade p. 178.
- Ibid. p. 173, 233. Significant is the
sentence on p. 245, where he points out that the determination of the
supernatural character of love is easier than that of faith. “Denn
einerseits hat sie den übernattürlichen Glauben schon zur Grundlage;
andererseits brauchen wir, um zu erkennen, wie sie eine Teilnahme an der
göttlichen Liebe ist, bei ihr nicht erst auf den Zustand ihrer
Vollkommenheit im Himmel zurück-zugehen”. The point is that this
procedure is necessary in the case of faith, whose super-natural nature as a
participation in the divine knowledge comes clear only from a consideration of
the vision in heaven, of which faith is the anticipation.
- He avails himself most frequently of the
dawn-day comparison: Natur und Gnade p. 241; Mysterien p. 619;
and often in the more devotional pages of the Herrlichkeiten. The notion
of the light of faith as an imperfect participation of the light of glory, of
which there will be question later, is of course, definitely Thomistic: e.g. De
Ver. q. 14, a. 9 ad 2m.
- Cf. Mysterien p. 616: the immediate
vision of God is the mystery . . . worin das Mysterium der Inkarnation and der
Gnade kulminiert.” On its place in St. Thomas’ theology of the
super-natural, cf A. Stolz: Theoloqie der Mystik (Regensburg,
1936), p. 154: “Das Wesen der Gnadenordnung Bestimmung and Ausstattung
besagt, mit denen der Mensch den Gottesbesitz, den unmittelbaren Schau auf
Erden anstreben and im Jenseits verwirklichen kann”. Cf. ibid. pg. 165.
- Cf. e.g. Mysterien p. 623: “Die
Verklärung, die Vergöttlichung des Geistes erfüllt denselben so
sehr mit göttlichem Lichte, dass er dadurch zu einer Erkenntnis, die an
sich nur Gott zukommt, zur unmittelbaren Anschauung des göttlichen Wesens
befähigt wird. In dieser Anschauung offenbart sich das ‘lumen
gloriae’ in seiner ganzen Tiefe and Erhabenheit”.
- Cf. the passages already quoted: “by faith as by the vision we are raised to the knowledge proper to God”
(p.9); by faith as by the vision we “receive the truth and the light by
which the Word of God is His natural Son” (p.14); “faith also is a
participation in the knowledge of the Eternal Word” (p.17); “our
likeness to the Father consists in this that He communicates to us a divine
power of knowledge” (p.19); other passages from the Dogmatik will
occur later.
- Natur und Gnade p. 244-5.
- Ibid. p. 242
- The same idea has been touched on before
where he speaks of the light of faith streaming “just as immediately from
the source of Eternal Light as the clear beatific vision of God”. Natur
und Gnade p. 160 (quoted on p.6).
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 786.
- Cf. Stolz’s formulation of the
Thomistic concept of grace, identical with that of Scheeben: “Sie ist ein
‘Sich-Gehaben’ (habitus), d. h. ein von Gottes besonderer Liebe in
der Seele hervorge-brachtes neues Sein, das ihn befähigt, naturgemäss
verdienstvolle Werke zu verrichten, die zum übernatürlichen Ziel der
unmittelbaren Gotteschau führen. Diese Auffassung vom Sinn der Gnade ist
für die thomistische Theologie grundlegend”. Theologie der
Mystik p. 159.
- Once he speaks of faith of “seminarium
visionis”, in Joann. c. 6. 1. 8, n. 1. The metaphor is in harmony with the
thought of De Ver. q. 14 a. 2 c, where the “prima principia rationis”
are “semina quaedam sapientiae”.
- On the following cf. Stolz:
Glaubensgnade and Glaubenslight nach Thomas von
A uin (Studia Anselmiana I, Rome 1933), a wholly distinguished and
extremely valuable study, a model of its kind for thoroughness, clarity and
objectivity. Chiefly in question at the moment is Ch. III: Das Wesen des
übernattürlichen Glaubens. Certain reserves however should be made;
the author seeks the supernaturality of faith too exclusively on its
intellectual side, and with reference to its material object; he does not come
to grips with the important Thomistic notion of the light of faith operating
“magis per modem voluntatis”, nor in general, with the decisive
import of the affective aspect of faith with reference to its supernatural
specification. This doubtless because he had certain adversaries (Billot,
Rousselot) in mind.
- De Ver. q. 14 a. 2. On the importance of
this article of G. de Broglie: Sur la place du
super-naturel dans la philosophie de S.
Thomas (1925) pg.25 note 15: “C’est à cet admirable
article qu’il faut toujours en revenir si 1’on veut préciser
la conception thomiste de la foi”. He indicates the points requiring
classification in the text.
- Cf. Stolz op.cit. pp. 56-60: 1. Zielstreben
setzt eine inchoatio finis voraus.
- Cf. Stolz op. cit. pp. 74-75.
- Cf. in Lib. Boeth. de Trin. q. 3, a. 1 ad
4m: “Hic tamen habitus non movet per viam intellec-tus, sed magis per viam
voluntatis; unde non facit videri illa quae creduntur, nec cogit assensum, sed
facit voluntarie assentiri.”
- Second Council of Orange cn. 5.
- De Ver. q. 14, a. 4 ad 2m; cf. ibid. a. 3
ad 8m.
- For further development of this Thomistic
concept of the genesis of faith cf. M. de la Taille: l’oraison
contemplative, Rech. Se. Rel. 9 (1919) pp. 278-9; ibid. 18 (1928) p.
303:
pour S. Thomas l’acte de
foi, meme de plus imparfait, a beau etre substantiellement, comme it dit, dans
l’intelligence, it n’y est néanmoins que comme un produit de
l’amour; l’amour commande le regard, librement determine l’acte,
et quant à son exercice et quant à sa specification. Enfin tout
ce qui caractérise l’acte de foi entre les autres actes de
l’intelligence lui vient de l’amour, l’amour pour la fin
dernière qui se propose à croire. La lumière même de
la foi descend dans l’esprit par la voie du coeur”. Cp. ibid. p. 316. Also E. Hocedez:
Valeur Religeuse de l’acte de foi, Gregorianum XV
(1934) p. 399, note 38.
- Cf. II-II q.7, a.2 c: “a qua
quidem impuritate purificatur per contrarium motum, dum sc. tendit in illud
quod est supra se, sc. in Deum; in quo quidem mOtu primum principium est fides.
Cp. in Lib. Boeth. de Trin. q. 3 a. 2 c:” fidei actus est primus motus
mentis in Deum”; the same in Rom. c. 3 lect. 3 and lect. 4. Also In Joann.
c. 6, lect. 4, n. 5:“ad Deum venimus non passibus corporis sed
mentis, quorum primus est fides.”
- II-II q. 4, a. 2 ad 3m.
-
“La cas de la foi n’est en
définitive qu’un aspect particulier de l’immense inquietude
humaine qu’exprime plus que toute autre, avec saint Augustine
l’âme chretienne: ‘Fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor
nostrum donec requiescat in te’. Or c’est dans une thèse
d’origine et de facture aristotélicienne que nous trouvons
l’expression chez saint Thomas, moins pathétique mais non moins
profonde: le thèse du desir naturel de voir Dieu. Tout.le
dèterminisme de la ‘nature’ aristotèlicienne vient
rendre raison métaphysiquement, dison mieux: thèologiquement, du
douloureux appétit de béatitude qui travaillait Augustin”. Chenu: La psychologie de la foi, p.
186. Cf. ibid. p. 174 ff.
- C.G. 1. III. c. 40; cp. I-II q. 67 a. 3:
“imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei, ponitur enim in eius
definitione”. “De tous les grands docteurs, je n’en connais
point qui méprise autant que lui la foi comme connaissance”.
Rousselot: L’Intellectualism de S. Thomas ed. 2, p. 193-4.
- QQ. Disp. de Malo q. 5 art. 3. The text is
interesting in view of Scheeben’s favorite metaphor, of which mention will
be made later: faith is an “Ueberpflanzung” of the divine cognition
into the soul. There is no evidence that Scheeben had in mind this text.
- II-II q. 1 a. 8 c. Here would belong all
the many texts in which faith is represented as a directive force in life and
action: e.g. q. 1 a. 7 c: (“credenda” sunt) via in
beatitudinem; ib. q. .1. a. 1 c: homo adjuvatur ad tendendum; in
Boeth. de Trin. q. 3 a. 1 c: ad humanam vitam in beatitudinem
dirigendam; De Ver. q. 14, a. 8 ad 9: per veritatem primam
deducimur: etc. The example of the schoolboy occurs four times: II-II q.
2 a. 3 c; De Ver. q. 14, a. 10 c; in Boeth. de Trin. q. 2, a. 1 c (and q. 3, a.
2 c); in Heb. c. 11, lect. 1. Its origins are of course Aristotelian. Both of
the notions here mentioned are combined in De Ver. q. 14, a. 11 c:
“possibile sit aliquem in statu viae cognoscere explicite omnia illa quae
proponuntur humano generi in hoc statu ut rudimenta quaedam quibus se in
finem dirigit.
- De Ver. q. 14, a. 8 c.
- La psycholoqie de la foi p. 178.
- Natur und Gnade p. 46; cp. pp. 44.
ff.
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