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[p. 231]
Chapter V
The Two Lights
It is the general law of the supernatural order that grace does not
destroy nature, but perfects it. In its application to faith, this means that
the grace of faith, traditionally called the "light" of faith does not destroy,
nor dispense with, but perfects the operation of natural intelligence, known
universally to philosophers as the "light" of reason. However, the intimate
nature of this "perfecting" is highly mysterious. In the present chapter I take
up Scheeben's views on the relations between the two lights. There are
naturally two chief points of investigation: what is the point of insertion of
the light of faith into the light of reason? and what are the functions and
effects of the light of faith?
We have seen already that Scheeben describes the genesis of faith in two
interesting metaphors. It is "eine Erzeugung göttlicher, d.h.
göttahnlicher Erkenntnis in der Seele aus göttlichem Lichte"(1), and
"eine Ueberpflanzung der göttlichen Erkenntnis in die Seele"(2).
And in terms of these two metaphors he gives a synthetic view of the
cooperation of nature with grace in the production of the act of faith.
First of all, the genesis of faith is not a purely mechanical process,
nor is it a sheerly divine creation. Analogously to natural generation, it
supposes both "receptivity and cooperation" on the part of the human soul.
Secondly, it supposes a soul proximately disposed by its own operations, — that
is, it supposes a rational knowledge of credibility and credendity, whereby the
formal motive of faith is to some extent "presented" to the soul, and its
material object to
[p. 232]
some extent apprehended. Informed by this double judgment,
the soul is in a state of "proximate, passive receptivity for faith"; and this
stage of the process is the "material conception of faith itself(3)". Then,
into the soul thus "passively disposed" enters grace to induce "active
receptivity", to achieve the "formal conception of faith". This active
receptivity implies a double element: first, intellectual, namely the
supernatural judgment of credibility, and secondly, voluntary, namely the
corresponding attitude of the will in virtue of which the proper light of faith
is to be actually received. The grace in question "completes and vivifies the
apprehension and presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) of the divine motive,
already introduced in the natural judgment of the credibility, and makes it the
living matrix of faith"(4). In this matrix faith is contained "as virtus and habitus", and out of it the act will be born through
the free action of the will cooperating with grace.
Hence the action of natural intelligence has been the preparation of the
"bosom in which faith is to be planted", and for this reason faith is
reasonable. "But the "Einpflanzung" itself, and consequently the substance of
faith, its root, its soul and its fruit, is the work of grace"(5), in such a
way however that it is conditioned by human cooperation in two respects: both
the effective acceptance of the light of faith and its actual employment in the
act of faith suppose the free action of the will.
From this statement of the case, it is clear that in the genesis of
faith the action of the natural "light" as such is in the purely dispositive
order. As we saw before, for Scheeben faith is a "new beginning", not causally
joined to the preambles(6). Secondly, it
[p. 233]
is clear that the action of reason
culminates in the eliciting of the rational judgment of credibility and
credendity. The prime function of this judgment is to effect a certain
"presentation" or "realization" of the formal motive of faith, and by so doing
to prevent the assent from being "blind"(7).
I would remark here that Scheeben definitely maintains the necessity of
this previous judgment of credibility, and vindicates to reason the power of
fashioning it(8). Though grace may indeed assist in its production, still the
action of grace is not thereunto absolutely necessary(9). Similarly, although
in its genesis it is not independent of the subjective dispositions of the
individual, and will always remain the object of a free assent(10), still even
as the product of reason it possesses not merely a "simple, so-called moral or
practical certitude"(11), but a certitude of a genuinely strict and objective
order.
But here attention must be called to the fact that Scheeben has not well
integrated his various statements concerning the motivation and object of this
rational judgment of credibility. When discussing the rationality of faith, he
speaks of it having as its motive "the fact of revelation", and as its object
the establishing of the "inward credibility" of the object of faith(12). (One
must remember what was said in the last chapter, — that for Scheeben the fact
of revelation was not a partial motive of faith, but a condition of the
application of the motive.) Later however in the same section, he insists that
the fact of revelation must itself be an "object of faith, and of the certitude
proper to faith, grasped or embraced in one act together with the formal object
of faith"(13). In this latter theory the previous rational judgment of
[p. 234]
credibility has as its object the fact of revelation, and as its motive the
divine signs which certify it. Thus he seems to "double" the rational assent to
the fact of revelation (an assent of free rational certitude), with a
supernatural act of faith in it. In this supposition, I do not see what happens
to the rational judgment of credibility, motivated by the rational knowledge of
the fact of revelation, and bearing upon the credibility of the revealed
object. After making an act of faith in the fact of revelation, does one revert
to a rational knowledge of it, and base thereon a second judgment of
credibility? Moreover, when he comes to discuss the supernaturality of the
judgment of credibility, he certainly seems continually to regard it as bearing
upon the revealed object, and resting on the "demand for faith that is put to
us in the external revelation"(14), — motivated therefore by the fact of
revelation. The difficulty is at least one of schematization, — with which
Scheeben was not greatly concerned.
At all events it is clear that Scheeben posits antecedently to faith an
objectively evident, though freely certain rational judgment of credibility.
Moreover, he posits it as actually and formally necessary for the proper
genesis of faith, — "ordinarily speaking there is no going on without it"(15).
However, one cannot go from it immediately into the supernatural act of
faith. A second, and supernatural judgment of credibility must intervene(16).
For this he gives two reasons. The first is of the theological order: were the
judgment of credibility itself not supernatural, "it could not excite and
direct a supernatural act of the will"(17), such as the "die gläubige
Gesinnung" must be. The second reason is rather of the
[p. 235]
psychological order, and
is suggested by the functions that he ascribes to the grace that
supernaturalizes the rational judgment of credibility. Its function namely is
to "complete", "transform", "repeat", "deepen", — or as he most consistently
says, to "vivify"(18) the rational apprehension of credibility and the demand
for faith that it includes. The nature of this "vivification" is explained by
the comparison he draws between the two judgments: the rational judgment is a
"speculative" one (though it also implies a vision of the "credendum"), while
the supernatural judgment is "effectively practical, i.e. one that actually
excites to supernatural faith"(19). Moreover the effectively practical
character of the supernatural judgment is explained further by the effect of
the "supernatural illumination" whereby the "vivification" is accomplished.
This illumination falls on the motiva credibilitatis on which the
judgment rests, — "grasps and presents them more profoundly and from a loftier
angle and hence in more living fashion"(20). It penetrates behind the external
phenomena to their "inner meaning as guarantees and instruments of the
authority and veracity of God"(21); and it also presents the authority and
veracity of God "in more living fashion and under a new aspect, namely as
belonging to "God as the auctor ordinis supernaturalis in His paternal
relation to His creature"(22).
This then is the reason why I said that Scheeben's second reason for the
supernatural judgment of credibility is of the psychological order, — grace has
namely a definitely psychological effect in its production; it does not merely
elevate the act, but alters its relations to its motive, and imparts to it a
new psychological qualification. In a word, now the thing works.
[p. 236]
The
same point comes clearer from the analogy that Scheeben adduces, — that of the
relations between sensitive and intellectual cognition as regards the
motivation of the rational appetite(23).
The next point to be noted is that Scheeben formally distinguishes the
grace which supernaturalizes the judgment of credibility from the lumen
fidei proper. He calls the former the "vocatio ad fidem", the "tractio" of
John 6, 44, the "opening of the heart"(24), or the "lumen inspirationis"(25).
The difference between them is this: "The former illuminates immediately to seeing that one must believe, and hence only mediately to faith itself;
the latter illustrates, i.e. empowers, strengthens and impels the mind to faith
itself, hence to the perfect apprehension of the motive of faith and its
content"(26). However, he admits that the two divine actions are most
intimately related, as the dawn is to the light of day, or as the "gratia
praeveniens actualis" to the "gratia habitualis justificationis"(27). Hence he
also admits that the former illumination can be ascribed to the light of faith
itself, — so, he says, St. Thomas in II–II q. 1, a. 4 ad 2m, et a. 5 ad 1m (the
celebrated "per lumen fidei vident esse credendo" text).
From this, Scheeben's point of insertion for the specific operation of
the lumen fidei is clear, — namely after the grace of vocatio ad
fidem has "vivified" and "transformed" the rational judgment of
credibility, and set the apprehension of the motive of faith (the authority and
veracity of God), already contained in it, under a higher light. However, here
again there is some discrepancy in his thought. For in beginning the discussion
of the mode of operation of the lumen fidei, he says that in his theory
of faith (in which
[p. 237]
the assent of faith is to be conceived as an immediate
judgment, based on an apprehension by faith of its formal motive), "the
specific activity of the light of faith needs first to insert itself at the
point where reason concludes its rational operation in the judicium
credibilitatis and credenditatis"(28). Obviously, to be consistent
with himself he must here be using the term "light of faith" in its broader
meaning, — though in this supposition he certainly should not have spoken of
its "specific activity". I bring up the point, not with the intention of
cavilling, but because in this delicate matter the utmost exactitude and
consistency is to be desired; it is vastly important to know whether the
supernatural judgment of credibility is a "specific activity" of the light of
faith as such, and hence whether it is distinguished, really or formally from
the assent of faith itself. At all events, it seems that Scheeben wished to put
a real distinction between them, and to exclude the supernatural judgment of
credibility from the specific activities of the light of faith.
The point now is: how did he conceive the purpose and functions of this
light of faith? Consistently with his theory, that there is in faith a new
affirmation and hence apprehension of its formal object, he assigns in general
as the purpose of the light of faith "to vivify and complete the presentation
("Vergegenwärtigung" i.e. the bringing home to the mind of) that object,
which presentation has been prepared for by the judicium
credibilitatis"(29). In this new "Vergegenwärtigung" (he repeats the
word four times) of the motive of faith, Scheeben sees the prime function of
the light of faith. By means of it the light of faith accomplishes the adhesion
to the object characteristic
[p. 238]
of faith. Of the way in which the new presentation
is itself accomplished Scheeben gives only a brief description. The initial
point is that the light of faith is "itself an emanation and an image of the
divine cognitive power". Being such, it "generates in the intellect a
supernatural assimilation and kinship with the same". And this supernatural
kinship has a double effect: "on the one hand the intellect is enabled and inclined to attach itself immediately and simply to the truth of the
divine knowledge, and on the other hand this truth presents itself immediately
to the mind in supernatural, mysterious fashion, and invites to its own
acceptance, — or rather, renders the mind sympathetic to it"(30).
Scheeben then illustrates the process by the analogy between the lumen gloriae and the lumen fidei. There is a certain sameness in
the object they illuminate: the Prima Veritas. However, while the lumen gloriae effects the clear "vision" of the Prima Veritas in
essendo, the lumen fidei can only effect an obscure "presentation"
of the Prima Veritas in cognoscendo, as the object of a "grasp" or
"embrace". Hence the former is independent of the human spirit's activity; of
itself it determines the vision of the divine essence. On the contrary, "the
latter, in order to accomplish the actual grasp of the divine truth, must be
set in movement by the will, and must be joined to a rational apprehension of
the term whereunto the movement is directed"(31). Consequently, it has only a
"relatively independent action". The point however upon which Scheeben insists,
against Lugo, is that the light of faith is to some extent "independent" of the
action of, the reason in the genesis of faith, — it does not operate merely "in
the form of a transformation and
[p. 239]
elevation of the natural power of thought and
conclusion proper to reason"(32). Rather, it implies a "mysterious contact and
union with the Eternal Truth"(33).
Such is the concept of the nature and operation of the light of faith in
its relations to the light of reason that Scheeben presents in the Dogmatik. I might remark incidentally that the essential characteristics
of the description appear also in the Natur und Gnade(34). There he
insists that the light of faith does not dispense with but rather presupposes
the rational knowledge of the fact of revelation; but the new light enables one
to grasp the revelation "in the right spirit". Its actual functions he
describes in Scriptural terms. It is "auditus et revelatio interna", whereby
God conveys to the soul the realization that it is really He Who is speaking.
It is "tractio Patris", whereby He raises the soul to rest in Him alone. It is
finally "illuminatio cordis", in virtue of which the mind is made "capable of
understanding the supernatural", and the revelation itself is made
"intelligible and graspable in a higher fashion", inasmuch as there exists now
a definite connaturality between it and the mind. The description is very
short, but the "illuministic" element is definitely marked. However, of that in
a moment.
It is already obvious that in his description of the nature and workings
of the light of faith Scheeben maintains a considerable consistency with his
fundamental ideas, as we have seen them. Underlying the whole description is
the notion of grace as a "divinizing" principle: the characteristic feature of
the light of faith is that it is "selbst Ausfluss und Abbild der
göttlichen Erkenntniskraft", which operates in the soul an "assimilation"
to itself. Hence there arises
[p. 240]
between the mind and the motive of faith a
"kinship"; here, as before, the notion of connaturality is brought into
connection with the notion of divinization. And to illustrate the former notion
a new analogy enters: "the mind of the believer is in similar fashion motivated
or attracted by the eternal truth through the light that streams from it, as
one body is attracted by another body in virtue of the fact that it is
electrified or magnetized by the latter". Hence, secondly, Scheeben is
consistent with himself in attributing to the light of faith an effect in the
psychological order; it does more than merely elevate the act, it confers a
definitely intellectual power that alters the mind's tendency to its object.
Scheeben's third consistency is in the sources he uses for his doctrine.
He emphatically rejects Lugo's explanation of the workings of the light of
faith, because it denies to the light of faith any independent action "above
and beyond the thought-activity of the mind". Moreover in his own treatment of
the judgment of credibility he apparently seeks to do no more than give back
th evia media of Suarez(36). A merely natural judgment of credibility
will suffice neither theologically nor psychologically, on the other hand it
neither needs to be nor can be supernatural quoad substantiam in the
Suarezian sense; that is to say, the necessity of grace for its eliciting is
not founded on the "substantia actus", i.e. on the judgment of
credibility precisely as an assent, based on the divine signs etc. This assent
is quite within the power of reason. However, apart from an "illuminatio
divina, quae elevet intellectum ad concipiendum illud objectum altiori et
supernaturali modo", the bare judgment would remain inefficacious "ad
excitandum et obtinendum actum voluntatis"(37).
[p. 241]
This is substantially also Scheeben's opinion. However, he follows
Suarez in denying that the supernatural judgment of credibility is elicited by
the light of faith(38), — though I do not think that he felt as keenly as
Suarez the difficulty and the necessity of determining just what "grace" it did
proceed from(39). The determination would have led him into some very sticky
metaphysics that did not interest him. Suarez' opinion was good enough for him,
though at that he does not follow it to its last details, namely the curious
reduction of this preliminary grace to the "donum intellectus"(40), — for
Scheeben it was simply "vocatio ad fidem". I might also add, as of some
significance, that he accepts without difficulty Suarez' exegesis of St. Thomas
(II–II, q. 2 a. 9 ad 3m), that the "interior instinctus Dei moventis" is not
the lumen fidei as such, but a previous grace for the intellect,
elicitive of the supernatural judgment of credibility(41).
However, though Scheeben's account of the supernatural judgment of
credibility is undoubtedly Suarezian, he maintains that his description of the lumen fidei as such "is nothing else but the Thomistic theory of
Capreolus, Bañez, Valentia et al., properly understood"(42). First of all, it
is a bit startling to see those three names, and the significant "u.s.w.", all
lumped together so airily. It was precisely such statements that made
Scheeben's writing the despair of Kleutgen, always so exact in estimating
individual opinions. With Capreolus and Valentia (not to speak of certain of
the nameless "u.s.w." people) Scheeben would have some exegetical difficulties.
However, for at least one marked detail of his opinion he may rightly appeal to
Bañez. P. Schlagenhaufen(43) sums up the latter's doctrine on the light of
faith thus:
[p. 242]
Es erhebt nicht bloss den Verstand zur übernatülichen
Ordnung, wodurch erbefähigt wirdzur Bejahung einer
übernatürlichen Wahrheit (elevatio potentiae), es verleiht ihm
auch eine Hinneigung (inclinatio) zu Glaubensbejahung.
Bañez sagt in geradezu klassischer Prägnanz: Das Zeugnis des Hl.
Geistes macht durch des Glaubenslicht geneigt zur Bejahung des
Glaubensgutes.... Da er mit Vorliebe die Funktion des Glaubenslichtes als ein
Geneigt machen bezeichnet, können wir mit aller Wahrscheinlichkeit seine
Lehre dahin umschreiben: Gott treibt uns durch das Glaubenslicht an zu einer
Glaubens bejahung, die jeden Zweifel ausschliesst.
Certainly this notion of the "inclination to assent" that is given by
the light of faith is essential to Scheeben's view. But it would seem to be
only one part of the action of the light of faith. The other part is a definite
"illumination". That is to say, the light of faith not merely impels the will
to assent to an object already proposed to it, but also "completes and
animates" the proposition of the object. The object in question is of course
the formal object of faith; Scheeben by no means wishes the light of faith to
confer some new intelligence of its material object. But essential to his
theory is the idea that the proposition of the formal object of faith which is
accomplished even by the supernatural judgment of credibility is somehow
incomplete and as it were lifeless. And the "relatively independent action"
which he attributes to the light of faith consists precisely in achieving a new
and efficacious presentation of this formal object. The effect of this new
presentation is to make the subsequent affirmation of the formal object (in the
act of faith itself) a new affirmation.
[p. 243]
Moreover, as regards the actual nature
of this new presentation, this seems to lie in Scheeben's thought: it is
identified with the new inclination to the object. Or perhaps more exactly,
both inclination and presentation (illumination) have their common root in the
new kinship with the divine truth that is the effect of grace. In this sense
his analogy is understandable: the object presents itself newly to the
magnetized body precisely in that it magnetizes it, i.e. confers a new
inclination to itself. And in the same sense is to be understood also his
warning that the light of faith is not be to considered as "causa objectiva
motiva" but as "causa efficiens" of faith. It does not, as does natural light,
fall upon the eye and make the object visible; rather it is "a living light
which makes the spiritual eye itself luminous, and makes its cognitive power
homogeneous and akin to the divine; it is generated by a communicatio vitae
from its living object, the veritas prima in cognoscendo, as its
ideal and generative principle"(44). By this last precision, Scheeben expressly
wishes to remove from his own doctrine the obscurity that he finds in that of
Bañez and the Thomists.
It is of the highest importance to note that for Scheeben the seat of
the light of faith is definitely the intellect; it is infused by God directly
into the intellect, and to the intellect it "immediately gives the power and
the inclination for the accomplishment of the assent of faith, or for the
supernatural apprehension of the ground and content of faith"(45). On the other
hand, he insists that the light of faith does not perform its work "quite
independently"; it must be directed by a previous perception of credibility,
and it must be "accepted" freely by the will, itself under
[p. 244]
the impulse of
grace, — it must be "set in motion" by the will. However for Scheeben the light
of faith as such does not touch or affect the will.
These are his assertions. But he vouchsafes no explanation of how this
"accepting" and "setting in motion" is to take place. Certainly his general
position suggests that of St. Thomas, for whom the light of faith "non est in
intellectu speculativo absolute, sed secundum quod subditur imperio voluntatis;
. . . ad hoc quod intellectus prompte sequatur imperium voluntatis, oportet quod
sit aliquis habitus in eo" (De Ver. q. 14, a. 4 c). Nevertheless the difficulty
remains — and it is, I think, the chief difficulty in this whole question of
the light of faith: How does the will "set in motion" the light of faith? This
is really the same question that was posited in the third chapter: How does the
assent of faith, elicited by the light of faith, depend upon the action
of the will? There it was directly a question of the motive of the
will's action, and of the organic unity between this motive and that of the
intellect; here it is a question rather of the grace that evokes and
supports the decisive action of the will. Obviously, this grace effects the
will's adhesion to its motive (presented to it by the supernatural judgment of
credibility), provides the ultimate impulse that determines the intellect to a
corresponding assent, and thus "sets in motion" the light of faith.
But it is extremely difficult to explain the intimate nature and
workings of this grace. In fact, just at this juncture, we come up against the
intimate and ultimate problem of the act of faith, which St. Thomas phrases
thus laconically: "Intellectus obtemperat voluntati Deo inhaerenti" (De
Ver. q. 14, a. 4 ad 2m).
[p. 245]
One might perhaps more satisfactorily explain the
intellect's "obtemperatio voluntati", if one could first explain the will's
"inhaesio Deo"; and one might explain this latter if one could only determine
the nature of God's seizure of the human will, which "corrects" it and turns it
to Himself, and unites it with Himself. Really, the absolutely ultimate mystery
of the faith is not situated in any "illumination", but rather in a "drawing"
("tractio Patris", John 6, 44). And this latter metaphor is not intellectual
in its connotations, but must rather be referred to the will.
In this connection I would signalize what must be considered one of the
most interesting details of Scheeben's doctrine on the light of faith. With his
usual sure tact, he selects two genuinely Thomistic metaphors to describe the
workings of the light of faith: it confers an "inclination", and an
"invitation" (in Boet. de Trin. 8. 3, a. 1 ad 4; in 3 Sent. d. 23, q. 3, a. 3;
II–II, q. 2, a. 9 ad 3m). In these two metaphors Scheeben felt that the
mysterious reality of God's action on the mind was shrouded: the Prima
Veritas "presents" itself by "inclining" and "inviting" the soul to its
acceptance, — (as I said above, Scheeben apparently identifies the new presentation of the formal object by the light of faith, with an inclination to it). There is a most valuable truth contained in that
idea, which did not escape Scheeben's keen theological sense. The only
difficulty is about his development of the idea. He himself posits the
inclination solely in the intellect, and thus he raises the question as to
whether such a concept of it actually exhausts the virtualities of the light of
faith. For St. Thomas, it did not: "hic tamen habitus non movet per viam
intellectus, sed magis per viam
[p. 246]
voluntatis: unde non facit videre ea
quae creduntur, sed facit voluntarie assentiri" (in Boet. de Trin. q. 3,
a. 1 ad 4m). The curious thing is that Scheeben himself seems to be reaching
for a similar idea, that would more adequately solve the problem of the light
of faith, when he insists that the light of faith must be "set in motion" by
the will, i.e. it must "operate" per viam voluntatis, though it is actually in the intellect. In other words, Scheeben was closer to St. Thomas
than he realized. I would suggest that the necessary step toward the completion
of his doctrine, — and the explanation of that of St. Thomas, — is to make the
will's motion also, and antecedently, a specific operation of the light of
faith: "facit voluntarie assentiri". Or, to alter somewhat Scheeben's
terminology, one might perhaps say that the light of faith sets itself
in motion, through the will.
At all events, even though Scheeben does not achieve a completely
satisfactory explanation of what the light of faith actually does (an
impossible task, no doubt), nevertheless it would be unfair to conclude without
a word of tribute to his fine formulation of what the light of faith is:
"Ausfluss und Abbild der göttlichen Erkenntniskraft". As is clear, this is
the fundamental idea about which he builds his whole theory, and it harmonizes
admirably with the rest of his system. Just as faith itself is a participation
in the divine knowledge, so naturally the prime function of the light of faith
is to effect that assimilation to the divine knowing power, which will make
possible a participation in the divine knowledge. And thus we are led back once
more to the basic idea which underlies all Scheeben's thought, namely, that
faith is the divinization of the human intellect.
[p. 247]
NOTES
Chapter V
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 804.
- Ibid. n. 805.
- Ibid. n. 804.
- Ibid. n. 805.
- Ibid. n. 805.
- Elsewhere he expresses their relation thus:
"Faith imparts a conviction that in its essence is intrinsically independent of
all rational conviction, although its actual existence is connected with and
dependent on such a conviction". And he illustrates the point by the comparison
of a plant, independent of the soil in its essence, but dependent on it in
fact.Ueber den Unterschied und das Verhältnis von Philosophie und
Theologie, Vernunft und Glauben, Katholik 1863 II, p. 279.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 804.
- Ibid. nn. 719, 720, 729, 799.
- Ibid. n. 800.
- Ibid. n. 751–755.
- Ibid. n. 751.
- Ibid. n. 721, 723.
- Ibid. n. 745. This theory does not appear
in the Katholik article just cited, but is clearly maintained in D. Oekum
Conc. II, pp. 249-251.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 796.
- Ibid. n. 799. The peculiarity of his
teaching on the origin of the certitude of the fact of revelation is this: the
signs, miracles etc. are not "logical arguments" but "documenta voluntatis
[p. 248]
divinae" (n. 749), and only as such are they proofs. I.e.
they express God's "imperious will" that the supposed revelation be accepted as
genuine (nn. 724, 735, 745, 748, 749, 754); thus they establish not the fact of
revelation itself but the obligation of accepting it; hence they are also
pledges of the divine veracity asserting it to be genuine, since God could not
allow a false revelation to be so certified that it would appear as obligatory:
n. 755; cp.D. Oekum. Conc. II, 249-251.
- This theory of the "double credibility"
appears fully developed long before the Dogmatik: cf. Katholik 1863 II,
p. 278–279. It is hard to believe that Scheeben brought it from Rome with him,
since it is not a particularly "Jesuit" doctrine.
- Dogmatik, I, 1, n. 796.
- "ergänzen" nn. 798, 801; "verklären" nn.
799, 800; "widerholen" n. 796; "vertiefen" nn. 799, 801; "beleben" nn. 796,
798, 799, 800, 801; also D. Oekum. Conc. II, p. 255; Katholik 1863 II, p. 278.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 799.
- Ibid. n. 801.
- Ibid. n. 801.
- Ibid. 801.
- Ibid. n. 801.
- Three expressions, ibid. n. 797.
- Ibid. n. 802.
- Ibid. n. 797.
- Ibid. n. 798.
- Ibid. n. 789.
- Ibid. n. 789.
[p. 249]
- Ibid. n. 789, italics in text; cp. Katholik
1863 II, p. 277.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 790.
- Ibid. n. 789. 791.
- Ibid. n. 791.
- Natur und Gnade p. 242, and notes 1
and 2.
- De fide disp. 6, sect. 8,
nn. 12–14. Scheeben's reference (n. 801): "disp. 6, sect. 6" is obviously
wrong, as his references not seldom are.
- Suarez, ibid. n. 14. (38)
- Ibid. n. 6.
- "difficile est resolutio", says Suarez,
ibid. n. 4; cf. n.1.
- Ibid. n. 14.
- Ibid. n. 13.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 792.
- Die Glaubensgewissheit und ihre Begründung
in der Neuscholastik. Zeitschr, f. kath. Theol. 56 (1932) pp. 555–556.
- Dogmatik I, 1, n. 792.
- Ibid. n. 796.
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