![]() |
||
| Method in Theology: Past Challenges and New Opportunities | ||
by
Dr. Şaban Ali
DÜZGÜN
The
Problematical Fields
Throughout its
history, theology experienced some difficulties in its relation to other
disciplines. Particularly in modern and contemporary periods such approaches
as foundationalism, text criticism, linguistic analysis and analytical
philosophy, existentialism, postmodernity (under the titles of
deconstruction or process philosophy), ect. have had a perennial impact on
theology. This situation has challenges and opportunities for theology.
These challenges made theology develop its own method and content with its
own criteria. In the following pages main characteristics of this new
theological approach will be outlined under some captions.
Ontology vs
God
In modern
times, philosophy has largely turned away from ontology, doctrine of being,
i.e. philosophia perennis, but theology can not turn away, nor can it
do so without cutting off the branch on which it sits. Because theology has
more in it than philosophy. It has a personal aspect in theology. In order
to make this doctrine of Being different from philosophy and metaphysics at
least three aspects of it must be brought forth: being, activity and
(inter)dependence.
This Being
is completely different from other beings. So a physical ontology which
reduces God to the physical realm and creates a closed universe must
theologically be denied. Bilateral aspects of this Being are to be
emphasised: Internal and external; the First and the Last, etc. This
paradoxical structure finds its extention in Holy Scriptures. And that leads
us to understand and interpret religious text differently from others.
Activity
of this Being is more vital to us. It is more than a theory of Being. His
activity together with ours creates history and forms real conception of God
and shows us the living face of God. In His activity we uncover his
mercy, wrath, etc. Besides intellect and reason, our very being in its
wholeness feels and judges Him.
God of Theology speaks with the language of the events, His creatures are
dynamic ones, and they borrowed their characteristics from their active
Creator. What makes the universe meaningful is not its substance as the
classical philosophy and theology put forward but the events that take place
in it, and our dynamic Theology is bound to formulate propositions or get
them from Holy Books to interpret the events as meaningful ones. The names
of Holy God and the events we experience in the World do co-exist, and this,
naturally, has some theological consequences.
The category of
(inter)dependence is the key concept to understand the nature of
relationship between God and humans. This category excludes two approaches:
One of them considers revelation like a stone fell down from top to humans,
ignoring human capacity and readiness to accept it. This supernatural
approach is humiliating humans and their ontic and epistemic structure that
was given to them to react and respond. The other one is the idea that man
with all his naturistic and rationalistic faculties is the unique criterion
of judging what is right or wrong. When we consider the Holy Scriptures'
language as the depiction of the relation between God and his
creatures rather than general account of being, it seems more plausible to
reconcile these both approaches. This reconcilation will be between
neo-orthodoxy and theological humanism or liberalism, the representatives of
above mentioned extremism.
This
reconcilation will create a "state of consciousness" in man, which will lead
us to search for an equilibrium between being "finitude" and having a
"telos/ultimate goal" to realize in this world. The tension created by these
two opposite edges of "finitude" and "telos/ultimate goals" can only be
dissolved by this consciousness.
Epistemology
Epistemologically rationalism and empricism have been problematics for
theology. These both by claiming only 'reason' or 'sense data" to unveil the
reality created reductionism and thus destructed the unity and harmony in
Being and led to foundationalism, which considers only one single faculty of
man as the real discoverer of the reality. This reductionism has in addition
to Theology caused problems in social and even in exact sciences. Ignoring
human capacity of intellect=nous, capacity of grasping a complex of
related terms intuitively as constituting a whole, rationalism concentrated
on reason or ratio=logos, the power of reasoning or ratiocination or
logical discourse, and so by bringing forth only one facet of understanding
reality, it destructed human integrity. This one faced rationality is
transformed into a system of criteria to value and judge others including
theological propositions, and accordingly every thing which had nothing with
rational or logical reasoning was rejected. What is striking is that,
religion considered reason as the unique faculty of man to be honoured and
to be taken responsible, but in the hand of rationalism, reason is
transformed into a means of undermining religion and theology.
The Nature
One of the
problems theology faces today is considering science and theology as
strongly contrasting enterprises. This contrast finds its roots in recent
history, especially in G. Galileo and Newton in Science and Descartes in
philosophy, whose approaches were considered as turning points in both
realms and beginning of the modern period.
When Newton
used God to fill the gaps in nature which he could not explain, he founded a
new relation between God and nature. By God of gaps, he reduced God to a
natural cause among others, and when these gaps are filled with natural
explanations, there was no place left for God to fill in this natural order.
Thus the natural God who had nothing with the person and community but only
with the nature, the great machine, had in the course of time faded away.
As for the
theologians of this time, they concentrated on nature to infer evidences of
God from it. In this process theology was reduced to intellectual
demonstration of God. God's prominent attribute was Creator not redeemer or
forgiver or something else which is directly related to faithful's personal
life. And as a result of this naturalistic tendency, the doctrine of
providence was related to nature, not to the individual and history. Little
was attributed to these phenomena a meaning which finds its place deep down
in the soul of the believer besides rational/logical and empirical
demonstration of God. So a new understanding of nature and its relation to
its Creator must be developed.
In this new sense, experience of this phenomenal world
is more than an experimental observation in its detached form, because
experience in theological context requires to participate in it, to be part
of it, not to detach from it. Accordingly such existential new concepts as
death, suffering, conflict, failure and cognitive ones like intuition or
total consciousness will be used in theological context so that our reason,
intellect and faith will become operative in their approach to nature. In
short, in
this new context, theology in addition to its commonality with science in
their 'hypothetico-deductive' reasoning will consider experience of nature
of phenomenal world as a ground for asserting God's reality, giving
individual a meaning and maintainin an ongoing relation
between them. This new understanding of nature will be conceptualised under
the term religious experience.
Contextualizing
Religious Experience within Theological Frame
So, one important factor to be imbedded into theology
now is religious experience. Althought it seems risky and even illogical to
put theology and religious experience together, this effort can activate
some cognitive and conative elements within man, which were ignored by
theology up to date. This effort, in addition analogical reasoning and
discursive observation of experienced realm, will take awe, reverence, joy,
that is mystrerious side of being into consideration as beatifully explained
by A. Einstein:
"The most
beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all
true art and science. He to whom the emotion is a stranger, who can no
longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead: his eyes
are closed. This insight into the mystery of life, coupled though it be with
fear, has also given rise to religion. To know that what is impenetrable to
us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom ad the most
radiant beauty which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most
primitive forms - this knowledge, this feeling, is at the center of true
religiousness."[1]
As this experience
is based on human's conative, cognitive and epistemic bases, religious
experience does not exclude knowledge, but it can not be fully reduced to
knowledge. Experience has interpretation in its very basis, so religious
experience is a kind of interpretation of internal or external
reality through which a faithful discloses his inner feelings. However, this
external reality does not necessarily create feelings of awe, reverence or
orientation within us, i.e. they do not have 'attention-directing' function
in themselves. In order that they can create such effect, 'second
experience' or 'interpretation' of this first experience is necessary. First
experience of external world functions mostly as a veil or curtain between
man and God. In order to make it religious or theological experience one
must go beyond it, rethinking or gaining a second experience as we call it.
This is stated in a Qur'anic verse:
"It is not given
to any human being that God should speak to him unless (it be) by
Inspiration, or from behind a veil, or (that) He sends a Messenger to
reveal what He wills. Verily, He is Most High, Most Wise."[2]
Cultural or given religious presuppositions condition this interpretive
process. Before
our observation of this phenomenal realm, we have in our mind our respective
paradigms to see this reality 'as' or to interperet it 'as'. In order to
underline this point, different models of experience have been put forward
such as 'seing as' (L. Wittgenstein and later J. Wisdom), 'experiencing as'
(J. Hick), and 'interpreting as' (I. Barbour).
[3]
It seems that a
difference is to be put butween these categories which seem on the face of
it to serve to the same aim. 'Seing as' or 'experiencing as' are categories
that find their roots in our ontic structure and there is no way of getting
rid of them. That means, to experience or to see 'a tuft of grass as a
rabbit in the twilight' can easily be corrected by seing it otherwise or
sometimes reasoning helps in these situations. However, 'interpret as' is
more than an ontic one, it also involves our cognition, evaluation, and most
importantly our will. So, if we are to speak about an encounter with God
which involves one's whole personality and total life, this is so because he
intentionally and consciously interpret it so and accordingly create a model
to follow. The summons Qur'an made to human beings to direct their attention
to created world, to mountains, to stars even to camel is a kind of 'second
experience' which involves this interpretation and categories it uses in
this process are cognitive ones such as reasoning, thinking, etc., all of
which make this process theological as different from former ones and render
it totally ours.
These challenges in bridging the gap between experience
and its clear communication and representation seem to have led some
philosophers to agnosticism and scepticism on the one hand, and to develop a
personal/existential and ethical approach toward religion and religious
experience on the other. This scepticism and agnosticism can be traced back
to Sextus Empiricus's book Against the Dogmatists, Al-Ghazâli's
al-Munqız min al-Dalâl, Blaise Pascal's Pensées, Tolstoy's
Anna Karenina, etc. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
and Philosophical Investigations, Martin Buber's I and Thou
and The Knowledge of Man, and many more. It seems to these thinkers
that there is an experience which contains more than could be said, and what
could not be said is as important as what could be said in experience.
To see the possibility of this communication, one example will suffice
mind. After trying to develop a model of communication, Wittgenstein turned
out to realize that a unique model for this task is unsatisfactory and
developed such concepts as 'language games', 'meaning as use'
and 'form of life', which put emphasis more on existential, ethical
and practical sides of this experience to enable any meaningful
communication. This means that a person who can understand and use language
can do so only because he or she participates (at least to some degree) in a
form of life. Within human life, there are many forms, and the meaning or
use of some words are to be understood by a knowledge or understanding of a
form of life. Religious language, has its place in a form of life to which
particular individals may or may not have access. In order to have access to
this language, one has to get an understanding of a form of life.[4]
S. Toulmin compares Wittgenstein to Pascal in their existential stances:
"He is like the French seventeenth-century writer, Blaise Pascal, who was
a brilliant mathematician and a wonderful controversialist for half the
time, but the other half of the time retired to the abbey of Port-Royal
outside Paris and meditated on the question whether his intellectual
brilliance was a temptation that God had imposed on him as a test for his
faith. As a good Jansenist, he was inclined to suspect his own motives in
being an intellectual and to reject his own intellectuality. Wittgenstein
had something of the same duality, torn between his own intellectual
brilliance and feelings of deep personal inadequacy which he struggled with,
not entirely successfully."[5]
It seems that, to enable communication and to certify
our knowledge it is taken for granted that there is a preceding reality
from which our cognitive faculties deduce some knowledge, which develops
an ontological basis both for individual and his knowledge of himself and of
God and around which many sui generis forms of life are developed. Of
course, what lies in the background of this understanding would appear to be
a metaphysic of the individual and of his life process, which combine his
awareness of his own relations, which lead on to an awareness of the Divine.
In this form of relations, to be is always to be with and to know always to
know something and to be aware is always to be aware of something, and this
feeling puts humankind within a web of relations and creates both
existential and prescriptive, i.e. ethical ground for being.
In these
assesments a kind of cognition rather than knowledge is
emphasised and the bases it rests are determined as 'consciousness',
'awareness' and 'web of relations'. Although these are completely true, one
important cause seems to be ignored. To set this 'consciousness' and
'awareness' in motion and to develop this 'web of relations' and to make
them general grounds for all, some more objective ground is to be searched
for. This ground will to some extent bridge the gap between totally other
being, namely God, and humans so that we can overcome the negative ontology
and agnosticism? This can be done by rendering God intelligible or
cogitable to humans in a way. But how?
As the religion
has the very concept of revelation (wahy:disclosure) in its basis (be
it in 1.oral or written communication as in the case of heavenly books
tradition, or 2.as in God's revealing himself through His creatures, that is
His self-disclosure as signs an symbols in general, or 3.as His showing his
living face in historical events), it is experimental*
and as it takes humans' ontic, epistemic and emotional integrity into
account, it has an anthropological basis. With this basis, revelation, with
its various forms, is open to humans' experience. As humans are equipped
with this ontic, epistemic and emotional integrity to experience, to cognize
and to know, there has been and will be an ongoing and fruitful interaction
between them. In order to secure this interaction on a wide scale, human
subjects are equipped not only with one cognitive element but many as
mentioned in the Qur'an such as qalb/heart, fuâd/inner heart,
sadr/breast, lubb/innermost heart in addition to their
aql/ reason and nazar/ intellect. With these
faculties, "human beings are therefore by necessity homo hermeneuma,
interpreters of signs. And human language, par excellence,
illustrates the grammar of these signs within which we are caught."[6]
These
self-disclosures must occur in a manner which corresponds to human
understanding. Hence we may sepeak of modes of Divine
Self-disclosure, and it follows that the criterion for their adequacy is the
degree to which they actually correspond to the process of human
understanding. So the most adequate mode of God's Self-disclosure to man
must necessarily be the human mode.[7]
But we are caught by a paradox here which is triggered
by two kinds of Qur'anic verses, abundant in number. One kind sees absolute
Being something beyond and above all human conceptions and references:
"Your Lord is
holier than the qualities which they ascribe to Him."[8]
The other kind attributes the title knowledge to
revelation which includes written text, signs/symbols in
external world and events in history, all of which are supposed to
increase our experience of God:
".Verily, if you
follow their desires after that which you have received of knowledge
from God, then indeed you will be one of the wrong-doers."[9]
As any theory which excludes some kind of cognition and
knowledge can not sustain itself as a general/objective ground for all, it
is a must to develop one to reconcile these two. Trying this, we do not aim
at removing this paradox. As there is a 'totally other being' we are
supposed to refer to through our human language, this paradox will always be
there. When disqualifying the superimpositons of language theories of
positivist tradition, from perspective of theological language this must be
case, which in no case poses any difficulty to theology. In the last
analysis, all these fields are referred not to render them the subject of
any theory of knowledge, but rather to develop and support this
consciousness, awareness and cognition.
Dr. Şaban Ali DÜZGÜN
[1]
Albert Einstein, "What I Believe," The Forum 84
(October, 1930), 194, from Frederic Ferré, "Einstein on Religion and
Science", American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, vol: I,
No. 1, 1980, 21.
[2]
Qur'an: 42: 51.
[3]
See for detail Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
(Basil Blackwell 1953), 194; John Wisdom, "Gods", ed. Antony Flew, in
Logic and Language, vol. I (Basil Blackwell, 1951); John Hick,
Faith and Knowledge (2nd ed. Macmillan 1967), 142 ff.;
Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study
in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974),
55.
[4]
Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology
(John Knox Press: Atlanta, 1985), 268; D.Z.Phillips, "Religious
Beliefs and Language Games", The Philosophy of Religion, ed. B.
Mitchell (Oxford Univ. Press: Hong Kong, 1986).
[5]
See http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/1997-03/toulmin.html
*
For an evaluation of differences between religious experience and
vahy see Adnan Aslan, "What is wrong with the concept of Religious
Experience", Islam, Christian-Muslim Relations, vol.: 14, no: 3,
July 2003, 299-312. ///
[6]
Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, tr. R. Manheim (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), I, 132; see also Graham Ward,
Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1995), 54; Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, tr. R.
Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), I, 132.
[7]
M.S. Raschid, Iqbal's Concept of God (Kegan Paul International:
London, 1981), 102.
[8]
Qur'an 37: 180. Similarly, he prohibition of graven
images 'or any likenes' (Ex. 20: 4) in biblical tradition serves the
same cause both as a rejection of idolatry and as an acknowledgment that
God cannot be adequately represented in visual or mental imagery.
[9]
Qur'an 2: 145; See also "And thus have We revealed it, a true judgment
in Arabic, and if you follow their low desires after what has come to
you of knowledge, you shall not have against God any guardian or
a protector" Qur'an 13: 37 and "He taught (gave as knowledge/ilm)
the Qur'ân" Al-Rahmân 55: 2. |
||
|
|
||