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[Woodstock Report, March 1991, no. 25, pp. 3-9]
Copyright © 1991 Woodstock Theological Center
All rights reserved
The headline of this story was the title of a Woodstock forum held on January 17, 1991. The moderator, Rev. Leo J. O'Donovan, S.J., president of Georgetown University, opened the evening's conversation with a brief introduction of the topic and the panelists. He requested each panelist to address those aspects of the war in the Gulf which he found most worthy of reflection. A precis of their remarks is recorded below. The views expressed at a Woodstock forum do not necessarily reflect the views of the Woodstock Theological Center.
Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, Joseph Kennedy professor of Christian ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University; consultant, Office of Social Development and World Peace, U.S. Catholic Conference.
John Courtney Murray, the American Jesuit renowned in this country for his contribution to public debate, once said that the function of the ethic of war was to help set the right terms of public policy debate, to help, in other words, to structure the debate about politics, strategy, and law in terms of a set of moral questions. And so what I will try to do tonight is to lay out that structure of moral questions and look briefly at how it relates to the debate we have had on the gulf and the debate we are bound to have as the war proceeds.
Essentially, the ethic of war starts with the presumption against the use of force. To look at war as a moral reality we start with the presumption that war is a bad way to handle human affairs. That does not say that war is never possible in moral terms but it says that to go to war one must meet a series of tests, a series of hurdles, if you will, to justify this blunt and bloody instrument of human intercourse. You start with the presumption against the use of force and the only way you can get to a justified use of force is by overriding this presumption, by reversing, that is, the basic insight that war is a bad way to deal with human affairs.
You can reverse that insight if you can meet a series of standards. The standards are grouped under three questions:
Now, if we look at the debate that we have had, and are still having, about the situation in the Gulf, these three questions help to sort out the various positions.
(1) The "why" question, the purpose or cause
There seems to be almost national unity, nearly unanimous judgement, that the actions Saddam Hussein had taken needed to be stopped, reversed, and prevented in the future. That is to say, if you look at the standard "just cause" position, namely, that force is permissible, at least in principle, to protect innocent life, to defend human rights, and to prevent aggression, then he seemed to give us an ideal just cause for resorting to force. There seemed to be almost unanimous agreement that this kind of action needed to be addressed by the international community and the United States. That then led to the second set of questions, the "when" question.
(2) The "when" question
The "when" question says that even in the face of "just cause," even in the face of serious violations of justice or human rights, precisely because war is such a blunt and unpredictable instrument, you have to pass a second set of tests. You not only have to have just cause, but you have to look at whether any other means is possible to resist the evil, to reverse the aggression.
Looking at the congressional debate, I think the debate divided along the "when" question. That is to say, everybody agreed on the "why," it was the "when" question that divided them. In raising the "when" question, you ask questions like, "Is this the last resort?" "Is there any other way to resolve this problem?" You also are required to ask the question that is sometimes called "the principle of proportionality." This principle asks, "Knowing that we face an evil that must be met, and considering using force to do it, will there be more harm done by the use of force than the good achieved in pursuing the so-called just cause?"
It is those judgements that are of particular significance in the debate that we have had. There was a statement from the Pentagon, before we began the war, that crystallizes the proportionality question. A spokesperson for the Pentagon said "We can guarantee the President the outcome, we cannot tell him what the cost will be." That is to say, we can guarantee, we think, that we can force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, but we can't tell him what the cost will be. Well, that raises the proportionality question.
For myself, in the course of the debate about whether war was justified, I found the proportionality issue so dubious, and to my conception of the possible cost of this war so high, that I put extra-special emphasis and weight on last resort. And so personally, I would have preferred to wait longer, to try other means, and not to resort to force as quickly as we did.
Now, the point to be made about this moral argument, namely about the "when," is that last resort and proportionality are inherently open to debate. That is to say, I cannot make a definitive judgement that some other means could have been used or that the cost would be too great. But I think those were the questions that moved me to say, "We should have waited longer."
(3) The "how" question
We are now at war and the third question will arise with great clarity. The central moral question, once you go to war, tends to be the "how" question. How war is to be pursued or the means by which it is to be pursued. The moral point here is that, even in the face of just cause, any legitimate use of force, morally legitimate, must be a limited use of force.
Limitation is conceived in terms of two principles:
We are now into the "how" question, the means question. And because an air war is so much a part of our strategy, the "how" question is of great importance. Air war by definition raises the possibility of striking civilians. I suggest we have to keep our eye on three questions:
The rules of engagement seem to be very strict. Colin Powell this morning said some planes did not drop their bombs because they didn't meet the rules of engagement which were meant to protect civilians. So both of those points need to continue to be scrutinized but they are useful to know.
And then there are the results. Because war is blunt and bloody and unpredictable, we will have to keep watching what the outcome of using this much air power is.
This is the ongoing discussion. On the "why" question, I think we have had consensus all along. On the "when" question, we have had division. Now, the "how" question becomes the central focus of the debate, because we are now at war using the instrument of force, because of the arguments that have been made about just cause and proportionality, and that have triumphed thus far in the debate.
Thank you.
Dr. William Quandt, Senior fellow at The Brookings Institution specializing in the Middle East and the international energy situation. During 1987-88, he served as president, Middle East Studies Association. From 1972 to 1974 and from 1977 to 1979, he served on the staff of the National Security Council, with special responsibility for the Middle East. He was involved in the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel which led to the signing of a peace treaty in March 1979.
Let me make my position clear at the outset. I had hoped that this war could be avoided. I would have tried harder to achieve our goals through other means. But I think that the goals to get Iraq out of Kuwait and to reduce Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors are legitimate objectives.
In my adult lifetime I have not known a major war that produced results that made me feel that war was an unqualified success. Most wars have unintended consequences that raise severe questions about the wisdom of having resorted to arms. Perhaps there was one exception that I was marginally involved with and that was the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which seems in retrospect and even at the time to have opened the way toward peace between Egypt and Israel.
And perhaps there is a lesson to be drawn here: that even as we are now concerned with the conduct of this particular war, we, like Anwar Sadat in 1973, should have a strategy for peace after the guns grow silent. And that's the slim hope that I cling to as I ask myself how I really feel about this war. I realize I'm guilty of succumbing to a kind of instrumentalist morality, thinking, that is, that the end may justify the means. But in politics and many other aspects of life I think that often seems to be the case.
So, I would argue that if the war can be concluded quickly, and if the civilian casualties can be minimized, and if we know when to stop (we should remember the lesson of Korea here) and if we honestly, in the aftermath of this crisis, confront the serious issues of the Middle East that need attention, I will feel that this war was justified. But that means we have to look beyond the present battle to the political and economic issues that need attention in the Middle East.
The two key issues that stand out are unfortunately the issues that Saddam Hussein has tried to capture. I think they have to be taken away from him and any other future demagogue who tries to exploit them. They are: the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the gap in the Middle East between the very rich and the very poor. We now are on our way, I think, to a military victory. But that may prove, in retrospect, to have been the easy part of promoting our interest in the Middle East. We are going to emerge as a very strong power in the region when this war is over. But will we use the influence that comes from that power to address the arms race in the region, to try find a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, to urge our rich Arab friends to help their poorer neighbors or to encourage respect for human rights in democracy?
If we do, then this war will be seen as a step toward creating a more stable and peaceful Middle East. And if not, then I think it is only going to be a matter of time before some future Saddam Hussein makes another bid for power, seeking to manipulate the grievances, frustrations, and sense of powerlessness on the part of a very proud people. And if that's going to be the sequel to this war, then it would have been better if we had left the sword in its sheath.
Let me say a final word. I have a lot of questions about the decisions that the President made leading up to this war in the last few months. There's no point now trying to second guess them. But in my own mind I have no doubt who bears the greatest responsibility for this war. That is Saddam Hussein. He started the war. And he, up until the last moment, had the chance of preventing it.
Thank you.
Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), U.S. House of Representatives. Congressman Solarz currently serves on four committees: Foreign Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Intelligence, and the Joint Economic Committee. He ranks fourth in seniority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he chairs the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
I welcome this opportunity to make it very clear at the outset that, like most Americans, I hate war. I much prefer peace. And I fully recognize and accept the proposition put forward by Bryan Hehir, that war should always be a last resort, rather than a first resort.
But last is not the same as never. I would submit that a study of American history, if not world history, should make it clear that there are times when war is not only justified, but may be necessary. Were it not for the Revolutionary War, we would not be independent. Were it not for the Civil War, the slaves might not have been freed and the Union would not have been preserved. Were it not for the Second World War, we would probably not be a free society and the world would have succumbed to what Winston Churchill characterized as "baleful domination."
The real question that confronts us, it seems to me, unless one of us is prepared to espouse a pacifist philosophy, is whether this particular war, at this time, in this place, is a necessary and justified war. I believe it is. I believe we have a number of vital interests at stake in the Persian Gulf today, any one of which would have justified a firm American response to Iraq's brutal and unprovoked act of aggression against Kuwait. But all of which in combination constitute a powerful and persuasive argument in favor of our having taken the steps we have just taken.
There is first of all the question of oil. The Persian Gulf is, after all, a part of the world in which over 50 percent of the proven petroleum reserves of the entire world are located. It seems to me that it is in the interest neither of our country nor of the world for us to permit a brutal dictator to be in a position where, through intimidation or invasion, he may literally have his hands on the economic jugular of the world.
But there is much, much more at stake here than the question of oil alone. Saddam Hussein in my judgement constitutes a clear and present danger, not only to the region, but to the world. This is a man who has gone to war twice in the last decade. First against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990. He has used weapons of mass destruction not only against his enemies but against his friends. And he is hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons as well.
This is a man who is determined to dominate the entire Middle East. And I have little doubt that if we do not stop him now, we would only be obligated to stop him later, under circumstances where he would be much more dangerous and difficult to contain than he is at present. I would submit that the great lesson of our time is that evil still exists in the world, and that when evil is on the march it must be confronted and contained.
The real question from a moral perspective that confronts us, it seems to me, is whether there were alternative ways of dealing with these problems. Could we have protected our interests and promoted our ideals without a resort to war? Could we have solved the problem through the continued and perhaps protracted application of sanctions? Could we have solved it through the creative application of diplomacy?
Let me make it very clear, that if I thought for a minute that there was a reasonable possibility that we could have induced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait through the continued application of sanctions, I would have clearly and strongly favored that course of action.
But I fully agree with Judge Webster, the head of the CIA, and with virtually everyone of our coalition partners, the British, the French, the Egyptians, the Saudis, that the sanctions by themselves would simply not be sufficient to do the job. They are, to be sure, having a significant economic impact on Iraq. But at the end of the day they are likely to reduce the Iraqi GNP by about 40 percent. Which means the per capita income of the Iraqi people will decline from about $3,000 to $1,600 a person per year. That's twice as much as Egypt, it's more than Turkey, it's higher than dozens of other countries around the world.
Those who have argued that sanctions can do the job, have in my judgement never established the connection between the undoubted economic impact of the sanctions and a political decision on the part of Iraqi authorities to withdraw from Kuwait. The truth of the matter is, Saddam Hussein doesn't give a whit for the welfare of his own people. All he cares about is the maximization of his own power. He doesn't have to run for re-election as president of Iraq in 1992. He doesn't have to worry about a contentious congress or a critical press or monthly Gallup polls in the Iraqi press reporting that his approval ratings have declined to single digits. So he will hunker down and he will wait.
And while he waits there is a very real possibility that the coalition will unravel. It is an inherently fractious and fragile coalition in which many of the participants, particularly the Arab countries, have different interests and perspectives than we do. Commitment to the sanctions could very easily erode, and, at the end of the day, we would have much more likely played into the hands of Saddam than deliver him into the hands of the coalition.
What about the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the crisis? To begin with, there was not the slightest indication from August 2nd onward that Saddam was prepared to consider complying, even partially, let alone completely, with the relevant United Nations resolutions. There was no indication that he was prepared to withdraw in exchange for the two islands of the Rumaileh oil field. There was no real indication he was prepared to withdraw in exchange for the establishment of an international conference on all of the problems in the Middle East.
And, even if he had been willing, I would submit that such an arrangement would have been the functional equivalent of a Munich in the Middle East: a reward for aggression. It would have legitimized Saddam Hussein as a preeminent leader in the Arab world. It would have legitimized the use of aggression as a means of advancing and addressing Arab grievances. And it simply would have set the stage for additional campaigns of conquest and annexation in the future.
Now, there are some who say that the annexation of Kuwait is unfortunate, the rape, the murder, the torture, the plunder, is unfortunate, but that the consequences of undoing it are so great that we should settle instead for a policy of containment. Draw the line at the Saudi border, they say, and make it clear that if Saddam goes any further, then we will go after him. Thereby, hopefully, we deter him from attempting to extend his way through the entire Gulf.
I don't think such a strategy was viable. Containment may have worked in Europe and in Korea for forty years. But there the presence of a substantial American military deployment contributed to the stability of the governments we were attempting to defend. In the Gulf, a substantial American military presence would more likely destabilize the governments we were trying to defend. And to the extent that we do have or would have a commitment to come to the defense of Saudi Arabia under such circumstances, I fail to see the political and moral difference between our willingness to shed blood in defense of Saudi Arabia and our current defense of Kuwait.
I would like to close with one thought. And it deals with this question of proportionality. I do not pretend to be an expert on Catholic theology or on Catholic writings on the doctrine of just war. But I have spent considerable time with Bryan Hehir discussing these matters and I believe he has much of value to say about them. When we consider these questions, nobody can say for sure what the consequences and casualties in blood and treasure will be as a result of this war.
But precisely the same questions had to be asked by the leaders of Great Britain in September of 1939 when Hitler invaded Poland. They had lost almost a million men in World War I, and they were reluctant to accept the consequences of another major conflict with Germany. Nobody could say for sure what the cost would be. Yet they obviously decided that whatever those costs, they were justified if that was the price that had to be paid to prevent Nazi Germany from going any further.
I would submit that in the case of Saddam Hussein we have a man who would not be content with the incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq. We have a man who would also attempt to spread his influence throughout the region, who would be likely, if he got away with this war of aggression, to launch additional wars in the future.
It seems to me, therefore, that it was not only in our interest, but that we were morally justified, even in terms of the principle of proportionality, in making the decision to use force to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
Thank you.
Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Senior counsel of the international law firm of Coudert Brothers. From 1979 to 1981 Mr. Linowitz served as the personal representative of the president to the Middle East Peace Negotiations and earlier as co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties, both with the rank of Ambassador. From 1978 to 1979 he was chairman of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. He served as the U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1966 to 1969.
I would like to tell you for a few moments about where I stand, a little about how I got here, and then a bit about some of the points that have been made in the course of this discussion.
I started out warmly supporting the President when he decided it was timely to move into Saudi Arabia. I was supportive of the President when he moved with the other nations, converting the action into a multi-lateral one, with the support and approval of the United Nations by the twelve resolutions. I strongly supported the President in his effort to impose economic sanctions, which I thought were necessary and would be properly suited to the challenge we met.
My problems began to arise very strongly with the increase of the force in Saudi Arabia in November, with what I regarded as failures to consult with our partners and allies in this multi-lateral undertaking while we initiated unilateral steps. And it seemed to me that we were not pursuing the diplomatic path with the kind of zeal that I thought was necessary if we were serious about it.
Having negotiated a bit myself, I know very well that no negotiation can succeed or remain effective unless both sides see an advantage for themselves as a result of the negotiation. And when we said clearly that there would be no negotiation, no concession, no give, it seemed to me that it was not very likely that any negotiation could be successful. And that indeed is how it turned out.
When the moment came for choosing whether or not it was timely and appropriate to go to war, I felt still that the sanctions had to be given more time to work. It was not at all clear that this was the moment for us to resort to military action. I knew that there were many who said that sanctions could not work. Congressman Solarz was among them, and he accused those of us who felt that sanctions might work, as offering only speculative judgements. I submit to you that the other side was indulging in precisely that type of speculative judgement.
But in any event, war came yesterday. Since it has come I think we all look to this nation, the President, warmly to be supportive of the men and women who are there now, to do whatever is necessary to assure that we emerge victorious, having fought the fight as it should be fought. I think that this whole question of how we got where we are today, will be examined by historians in great detail and it does not serve a useful purpose for me to go back now and begin to pick further at it.
It seems to me that the focus needs to be placed, even at this early point, on what it is we are fighting for and what we hope to achieve by this war. There are a lot of questions we have to begin to answer. What will be the situation in Iraq if we win? If Saddam is crushed? If our efforts are successful? Who will succeed Saddam Hussein? What can we do to assure that that government does not again become a threat to the peace and security and stability of the Gulf? What role will there have to be for the United States in the future? Will we have to keep forces there? Will Saudi Arabia allow us to do so? How large a force? What role for the United Nations? Should there be a peace keeping effort? Should other countries be asked to play their part? What economic commitment is going to be required to rebuild these countries that are now being devastated? What part will the United States have to play? What about the Palestinian problem? How do we begin to come to grips with that?
These are just a few of the questions that have to be faced-up to very soon. Just as important as the way we wage this war will be the way we wage the peace following this war. What we do? How we act? What responsibilities do we assume? Where do we hope to come out? And I hope in the course of the discussion this evening we can grope for answers to these issues.
Let me just conclude by reminding you of the wise words of Theodore Roosevelt, strange though it is to be quoting him in a matter of this sort. He once said this: "The United States does not have an option as to whether it will or will not play a great part in the world. It must play a great part. The only question is, will it play that part well or badly?"
Thank you.